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1 Introduction
The paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, Russell’s Paradox,
and Ko¨nig’s Paradox are prima facie sound arguments which give rise to
contradictions. For the most part, solutions—both historical and contempo-
rary—have tried to solve the paradoxes by breaking the arguments: some
premise is not true, or some inference employed is invalid. The results have
not been encouraging. After two and a half thousand years, there has been
no successful solution, at least for the semantic paradoxes, if consensus is
to be the mark of success. A dialetheic solution is historically very recent,
and stands out against the crowd. At its core is the thought that there is
absolutely nothing wrong with the arguments, and that the contradictory
conclusions are simply to be accepted.
Central to the paradoxes are very general principles governing semantic
and set theoretic apparatus. These all deploy some notion of conditionality,
or more accurately, biconditionality. Let us use⇒ and⇔ as generic symbols
for a conditional and biconditional. (We assume that these are related in the
usual fashion.)1 Let T be the truth predicate, S the one-place satisfaction
relation, D the denotation relation, and 〈.〉 a name-forming device. Then
the principles are as follows. (Ax(y) indicates the formula A with every free
occurrence of x replaced by y—relabelling bound variables if necessary, to
avoid clashes).
• T -Schema: for all closed sentences, A, T 〈A〉⇔ A
• S-Schema: for every formula, A, with one free variable, x, S(y, 〈A〉)⇔
Ax(y)
• D-Schema: for every (closed) name, c: D(〈c〉 , y)⇔ c = y
• Set Abstraction: for every formula, A: yε{x : A} ⇔ Ax(y)
• Property Abstraction: for every formula, A: λxA(y)⇔ Ax(y)
Let us call these naive principles.2
1In this essay, I will use ⊃ for the material conditional, and → for a detachable inten-
sional conditional. I use ⇒ when I want to be non-committal about what conditional is
employed.
2From the Old French, na¨ıf, meaning natural.
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A crucial question here is what, exactly, the conditional, ⇒, in the naive
principles is. In ‘Logic of Paradox’,3 I outlined two options. One is to take it
to be the material conditional of the extensional paraconsistent logic LP , ⊃.
Call this Strategy 1. LP is a relatively weak logic, however. In particular, ⊃
does not detach. (That is, the inference from A and A ⊃ B to B is not valid.)
The other strategy is to take it to be some detachable conditional. Call this
Strategy 2. Since there is no candidate for this in LP , it has to be added to
the language, and appropriate semantics given. A natural candidate here is
the conditional of some non-contracting relevant logic, in which LP can be
embedded.
Dialetheism, and its applications to the paradoxes and other things, were
articulated in In Contradiction, hereafter, IC.4 In this, though there is
certainly material relevant to Strategy 1, it was mainly Strategy 2 that was
pursued; and the strategy of taking ⇒ to be a detachable conditional has
been pursued by most people who have endorsed the naive principles.5 By
contrast, Strategy 1 has been advocated by few, a notable exception being
Goodship (1996).
The aim of the present essay is to investigate Stragey 1. It is not to
advocate it. The work is simply an extended exploration of the strategy,
its strengths, its weaknesses, and the various different ways in which it may
be implemented. In the first part of the paper I will set up the appropriate
background details. In the second, I will look at the strategy as it applies
to the semantic paradoxes. In the third I will look at how it applies to the
set-theoretic paradoxes. One of the crucial issues to emerge will be that of
whether Curry’s paradox is of the same kind as the Liar. This deserves an
extended discussion, but such would take us off at something of a tangent
to the main investigations; so I reserve the discussion for an appendix of the
paper.6
3Priest (1979).
4Priest (1987). References are to the second edition.
5See, e.g., Beall (2009), Brady, (2006), Field (2009), Routley (1977). Brady and Field
produce consistent formal theories by not endorsing the Law of Excluded Middle.
6Much of this paper was written in the second half of 2013, when I was a Humboldt
Fellow at the University of Bochum. Many thanks go to the Humboldt Foundation for its
generous support. Many thanks, too, go to Heinrich Wansing and his department for the
congenial and stimulating atmosphere provided.
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2 Logical Preliminaries
2.1 LP
In this section I will spell out some preliminary formal matters concerning
the logic LP .7
Take a first-order language (without function symbols, for simplicity),
with the connectives for negation, conjunction, disjunction (¬, ∧, ∨), and
the particular and universal quantifiers (∃ and ∀). A ⊃ B is defined as
¬A∨B, and A ≡ B as (A ⊃ B)∧ (B ⊃ A). We also assume a distinguished
binary predicate of identity, =.
An interpretation, M, is a pair 〈D, δ〉, where D is the non-empty domain
of quantification; for every constant, c, δ(c) ∈ D; and for every n-place
predicate, Pn, δ(Pn) = 〈X, Y 〉, where X ∪ Y = Dn (the set of all n-tuples
of D). We will write X and Y as δ+(Pn) and δ
−(Pn), respectively. δ+(=) =
{〈x, x〉 : x ∈ D}.
If we were to drop the constraint that for all predicates, Pn, δ
+(Pn) ∪
δ−(Pn) = Dn, we would have the logic of first degree entailment, FDE
(which does not have the Law of Excluded Middle). If we were to add the
constraint that for all predicates, Pn, δ
+(Pn) ∩ δ−(Pn) = ∅, we would have
classical logic, CL.
We can now define what it is for a (closed) formula to be true, +, or
false, −, in M. For the quantifiers, we assume that the language has been
extended by a bunch of new constants, kd, one for every d ∈ D, such that
δ(kd) = d. We will call this extension the language of the interpretation.
For closed formulas of the language of M:
• + Pnc1...cn iff 〈δ(c1), ..., δ(cn)〉 ∈ δ+(Pn)
• − Pnc1...cn iff 〈δ(c1), ..., δ(cn)〉 ∈ δ−(Pn)
• + ¬A iff − A
• − ¬A iff + A
• + A ∧B iff + A and + B
• − A ∧B iff − A or − B
7See Priest (2008), chs 7 and 21.
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• + A ∨B iff + A or + B
• − A ∨B iff − A and − B
• + ∃xA iff for some d ∈ D + Ax(kd)
• − ∃xA iff for all d ∈ D − Ax(kd)
• + ∀xA iff for all d ∈ D + Ax(kd)
• − ∀xA iff for some d ∈ D − Ax(kd)
An interpretation is a model of a formula, A, iff + A; it is a model of a set
of formulas, Σ, if it is a model for every formula in Σ. And an inference is
valid, Σ LP A, iff every interpretation which is a model of Σ is a model of
A. (In what follows, I will often omit the subscript when no confusion can
arise.)
In order to visualise how the truth functions work, it is sometimes helpful
to represent the information as follows. Let us write t, f , and b, to mean,
respectively, that a formula relates only to truth, only to falsity, or to both.
Then the truth and falsity conditions may be depicted in the following tables:
∨ t b f
t t t t
b t b b
f t b f
∧ t b f
t t b f
b b b f
f f f f
¬ t
t f
b b
f t
It is easy to check that the tables for ⊃ and ≡ are then:
⊃ t b f
t t b f
b t b b
f t t t
≡ t b f
t t b f
b b b b
f f b t
∀ and ∃ are the infinitary analogues of ∧ and ∨. If one thinks of LP as a
three-valued logic, then the designated values are t and b.
Clearly, if Σ LP A then Σ CL A, but not conversely, since LP is
paraconsistent. However, it is also the case that if LP A then CL A.8
8See IC, ch. 6.
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2.2 Material Equivalence
Since material equivalence will play a central role in what follows, it will pay
to think about it a little more. Given the above tables, it is easy to check
the following inferences:
• A ∧B  A ≡ B
• ¬A ∧ ¬B  A ≡ B
• A ≡ B  (A ∧B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
• A ∧ ¬B  ¬(A ≡ B)
• ¬A ∧B  ¬(A ≡ B)
• ¬(A ≡ B)  (A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (A ∧ ¬B)
The first three inferences say that A ≡ B is true iff A and B are both true
or both false. The second three say that A ≡ B is false iff one of A and B is
true, and the other false. The following are also easy to check, and useful to
note, where A! is A ∧ ¬A:
•  A ≡ A
• A ≡ B  B ≡ A
• A ≡ B,B ≡ C |= (A ≡ C) ∨B!
• A!  A ≡ B
• A!  ¬(A ≡ B)
Perhaps the most surprising of these initially is the fourth. The rationale
is as follows. B is either true or false. Suppose that it is true. (The other
case is similar.) Given that A! is true, A is true; so A and B have the same
truth value, and A ≡ B is true. Of course, given that A! is true, ¬A is
true too, so A and B have different truth values, and ¬(A ≡ B) is true
too—which is what the fifth inference tells us. Note also, as is easy to check,
that A,A ≡ B 2 B, though A,A ≡ B  B ∨ A!.
Finally, it may be illuminating to look at matters diagramatically. Classi-
cally, every interpretation partitions sentences of the language into two zones,
the truths (T) and the falsehoods (F), the two zones being mutually exclusive
and exhaustive:
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If two sentences are both in the same zone, their material equivalence is in
the T zone; whilst if one is in one zone, and the other is in the other zone,
their material equivalence is in the F zone. (See the diagram above.)
In LP , everything is the same except that the T and the F zones may
overlap. Thus we have the following picture:
As before, the material equivalence of two sentences is in the T zone iff both
are in the same zone (T or F), and in the F zone if they are in different
zones. But now, of course, a sentence—and so a material equivalence—can
be in both zones. (See the next diagram.)
2.3 The Substitutivity of Equivalents
We can also see that the material conditional satisfies the substitutivity of
equivalents. First, note the following facts about LP . Given any interpreta-
tion, M:
• if + A ≡ B then + ¬A ≡ ¬B
• If + A ≡ B and + C ≡ D then + (A ∧ C) ≡ (B ∧D)
• If + Ax(kd) ≡ Bx(kd) for all kd in the language of the interpretation,
then + ∀xA ≡ ∀xB
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The first is easy to see. For the second, suppose that, in M, (A∧C) ≡ (B∧D)
is f . Then A ∧ C is t and B ∧ D is f—or vice versa, the result of which
is the same. Then A and C are t, and at least one of B and D is f . So
either A ≡ B or C ≡ D is f . For the third, suppose the antecedent. Then
by the truth conditions of the universal quantifier, + ∀x(A ≡ B). But
∀x(A ≡ B) |= ∀xA ≡ ∀xB. For suppose that in an interpretation the
conclusion is f . Then ∀xA is t and ∀xB is f—or vice versa, the result of
which is the same. Hence every instance of A is t, and some instance of B
is f . Hence, some instance of A ≡ B is f , and so is ∀x(A ≡ B). The result
follows.
It is now easy to show that in any interpretation, if + [∀](A ≡ B), then
+ DC(As) ≡ DC(Bs). Here, [∀] indicates universal closure, s is any map
from variables to the constants of the language of the interpretation, Cs is
C with the free variables substituted according to s, and DC(E) is D with
every occurrence of the subformula C replaced by E. If C does not occur in
D, the result holds vacuously. If it does, D is made up of truth functions
and quantifiers applied to C. We can now prove the result by induction on
the construction. The basis case follows by universal instantiation, and the
cases for ¬, ∧, and ∀ are given by the above results. Disjunction and the
particular quantifier can be thought of as defined in the usual ways. It follows
that provided no variable free in A or B is bound when substituted into D,
[∀](A ≡ B)  [∀](DC(A) ≡ DC(B)).
2.4 Monotonicity
Finally, one technical result will be useful in what follows. The connectives
and quantifiers of LP are monotonic—in the sense that if one takes a formula
and increases the truth values of its atomic components (say, from just true to
true and false), the truth values of the formula do not decrease. We can make
the point precise as follows. Given two LP interpretations, M1 = 〈D1, δ1〉
and M2 = 〈D2, δ2〉, say that:
• M1 ≤M2 iff D1 = D2; and for every predicate, P , δ+1 (P ) ⊆ δ+2 (P ) and
δ−1 (P ) ⊆ δ−2 (P )
The Monotonicity Lemma then tells us that if M1 ≤ M2 then for every
sentence, A, in the language of M1 (or M2):
• if M1 + A then M2 + A
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• if M1 − A then M2 − A
The Lemma may be proved by a straightforward induction.
Looking at things in terms of t, b, and f , and letting the values of A
in M1 and M2, respectively, be |A|1 and |A|2, it follows that the value b is
preserved upwards:
• if M1 ≤M2 then if |A|1 = b then |A|2 = b
and that classical values are preserved downwards. That is:
• if M1 ≤M2 then, if |A|2 = t, |A|1 = t
• if M1 ≤M2 then, if |A|2 = f , |A|1 = f
3 A First Look at the Idea
3.1 The Positives
Thus primed, let us turn to the basic idea of Strategy 1 with respect to the
semantic paradoxes. I will direct my remarks, in the first instance, to truth,
though similar comments apply to the other semantic notions.
The idea that the biconditional involved in the T -Schema is the material
conditional is certainly a very simple and natural one. As we have just seen,
a material conditional is true, just if both of its flanks are in the same zone:
both true or both false. Now, the prime idea that informs the natural view
about truth is exactly that A and T 〈A〉 have the same truth value; that is,
that they are in the same zone (possibly necessarily so; but we do not need
to take a stand on this here). This is exactly what the material conditional
expresses. So the prime idea about truth is expressed exactly by the Schema
T 〈A〉 ≡ A.9 We may define a falsity predicate, F 〈A〉 as T 〈¬A〉. It then
follows that F 〈A〉 ≡ ¬A.
Note three things. (i) By substitutivity, T 〈A〉 ≡ A  DC(T 〈A〉) ≡
DC(A) (and similarly for F .) (ii) The T -Schema in this form contraposes,
since A ≡ B  ¬A ≡ ¬B. This does not mean that truth commutes with
negation, however. We have T 〈¬A〉 ≡ ¬A and ¬T 〈A〉 ≡ ¬A but this entails
9It might be thought that A and T 〈A〉 should have exactly the same truth values, but
this is moot. If A is true and false, then ex hypothesi, T 〈A〉 is true, but it may not be
false as well. It may express the truth of A consistently. See IC, 5.4.
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only that (T 〈¬A〉 ≡ ¬T 〈A〉) ∨A!. (iii) The material biconditional does not
determine the extension of T completely. If T1 〈A〉 ≡ A and T2 〈A〉 ≡ A, it
follows that (T1 〈A〉 ≡ T2 〈A〉)∨A!. So what happens when A is a dialetheia
is not determined. The first disjunct says that T1 〈A〉 and T2 〈A〉 are both
true or both false, but even this leaves open the possibility that one of these,
but only one, is both.
Next, the Schema does, indeed, give rise to contradictions when self-
reference is present. With appropriate self-reference, we can find a sentence,
L, of the form ¬T 〈L〉. The Schema than delivers a sentence of the form
¬L ≡ L, that is, (¬L ⊃ L)∧ (L ⊃ ¬L); that is, (¬¬L∨L)∧ (¬L∨¬L). And
given the law of double negation, this is just L!. Note that the argument
does not even make use of the LEM.10
Next, the theory, even when annexed to arithmetic, and so self-reference,
is non-trivial. In particular, take the set of all sentences true in the standard
model of arithmetic. Use go¨del coding for naming; this delivers self-reference.
The addition of the material T -Schema produces a conservative extension.
The proof of this is almost trivial.11 Take the standard model of arithmetic,
with domain N , and add a denotation for the truth predicate which makes
δ+(T ) = δ−(T ) = N . This does not disturb the arithmetic vocabulary, but
renders all instances of the T -Schema true, since A!  A ≡ B. Of course,
this is not a particularly interesting model, and there is no reason to believe
that the truth predicate actually works like this—indeed, there are reasons to
suppose that it does not. There are models where the truth predicate is much
more consistent than this. For example, as we will see in due course, there
are models of the theory in which A and T 〈A〉 have exactly the same truth
values, and T 〈A〉 is consistent if A is grounded (in pretty much Kripke’s
sense).
Finally, other things being equal, this approach to the paradoxes is an
exceptionally simple solution to the paradox. The T -Schema + LP is simpler
by orders of magnitude than virtually all the other extant accounts of truth
10More generally, it is not difficult to show that if Σ |=CL A then for some B, Σ |=LP
A ∨ B!. (See IC, 8.6.) Hence, if Σ classically entails a contradiction, A!, it entails a
contradiction in LP, A! ∨B!.
11See Priest (2002a), 8.1. It is worth noting that with the usual language of formalised
arithmetic (where the only function symbols are those for successor, addition, and multi-
plication), we cannot find a sentence, L, that is ¬T 〈L〉 (as opposed to being equivalent to
it). The standard fixed-point construction delivers a sentence such that L ≡ ¬T 〈L〉. But
(L ≡ ¬T 〈L〉) ∧ (L ≡ T 〈L〉) entails (T 〈L〉 ≡ ¬T 〈L〉) ∨ L!. So we still have T 〈L〉! ∨ L!.
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and paradox.
3.2 The Negatives
The main objection to the core idea, is, however, obvious: the material
conditional (and biconditional) do not detach. So, given only the material
T -scheme, one cannot infer A from T 〈A〉, or vice versa. Now, we certainly
do seem to reason using detachment in this way. Thus, for example, as many
have noted,12 one function of the T -scheme would appear to be to make
endorsement possible in contexts where this cannot be done explicitly.
One such context is that of blind endorsement, as where one might say:
Everything the Bible says is true. Then, it is natural to reason as follows:
Everything the Bible says is true.
The Bible says that there is a time for every purpose under heaven.
So there is a time for every purpose under heaven.
Assuming that we can conclude from the premises that it is true that there
is a time for every purpose under heaven, it would appear that we need the
T -Schema and detachment to infer the last line.
Similarly, we might reason:
Everything true is said in the Bible.
People have evolved.
So the Bible says that people have evolved.
Here we need detachment with the T -Schema in the other direction.
Another context is where we would endorse all of an infinite number of
claims. Thus, we might say ‘All of the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true’
(the axioms being infinite in number). Given that ‘∀x x′ 6= 0’ is an axiom of
Peano Arithmetic, we may infer that T 〈∀x x′ 6= 0〉, but with a non-detachable
T -Schema, one cannot infer that ∀x x′ 6= 0.
4 Some Advantages of the Proposal
So much for a first look at matters. Let us now examine the positives and
negatives in more detail, starting with the positives in this section. One of
12I do so in IC, 4.2.
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the most striking thing about Strategy 1 is that it handles not just the Liar
paradox, but a plethora of others as well, as we will now see.
4.1 Curry Paradox
For Goodship, a major advantage of Strategy 1 concerns the Curry Paradox.
One standard version of this concerns a sentence, C, of the form T 〈C〉 ⇒ ⊥,
where ⊥ is a logical constant which entails everything. Putting the argument
in natural deduction terms, its core is as follows.
T 〈C〉 T 〈C〉 ⇔ C
C
T 〈C〉 T 〈C〉 ⇒ ⊥
⊥
T 〈C〉 ⇒ ⊥
The argument uses modus ponens (MP) for the biconditional of the T -Schema
(and for the conditional of the Curry sentence itself), and the last line dis-
charges both occurrences of the assumption T 〈C〉. This argument gives us
an unconditional proof of T 〈C〉 ⇒ ⊥, that is, C. This and the T -Schema
then deliver T 〈C〉 by MP, whence applying MP again delivers ⊥.
Most of the solutions to the Paradox which endorse the T -Schema deny
Contraction. That is, an application of ⇒-introduction cannot discharge
multiple assumptions of the antecedent. This solution may be implemented
in a contraction-free logic, such as a weak relevant logic. In the axiomatic
forms of these logics, Contraction is equivalent to the validity of the inference:
A⇒ (A⇒ B) ` A⇒ B.
Now, to many eyes it would appear to be the case that the Liar Paradox
and Curry’s Paradox are of a piece. The Principle of Uniform Solution (Same
Kind of Paradox, Same Kind of Solution)13 would therefore dictate that they
have the same kind of solution. But rejecting Contraction has nothing to do
with a dialetheic solution to the Liar Paradox. So there seems to be a problem
here.
Whether or not the Curry paradox and the Liar paradox are of a kind
is a thorny question, but given the importance of the Curry paradox to the
matters at hand, it is an important one. Its discussion would, however, take
13See Priest (2002b), 11.5.
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us off at a tangent to matters immediately to hand. So I will reserve a dis-
cussion of the matter till an appendix to this paper. Here, I simply note that
Strategy 1 solves the Curry paradox as well as the Liar: the (bi)conditional
of the T -scheme does not detach. The non-triviality argument of Section 3
demonstrates the non-triviality of the Curry sentence just as much as the
Liar sentence (even if the language contains a detachable conditional, as we
shall see). So if the Liar and Curry are of a kind, Strategy 1 gives the two
the same solution, as required by the Principle of Uniform Solution. In par-
ticular, we can just take T 〈C〉 to be both true and false. The failure of
detachment does the rest.
Moreover, even if the two paradoxes are not the same kind, this solution is
simpler than the non-contracting solution. The explanations of the failure of
conditional contraction—even if they are right—all involve a world semantics,
indeed a semantics with impossible worlds; it is clear that this is much more
complex. And there is, presumably, nothing problematic about different
kinds of paradoxes having the same kind of solution. That is, one should not
expect to have Different Kind of Paradox, Different Kind of Solution. The
same drug can, after all, cure different illnesses. Thus, IC argues that both
the paradoxes of self-reference and Zeno’s Arrow Paradox—quite different
sorts of paradox—may be solved by endorsing dialetheism. Even if one holds
that the Arrow Paradox is not to be solved by deploying dialetheism, one
would hardly argue that this cannot be the solution since dialetheism solves
the paradoxes of self-reference.
4.2 Validity Curry
There are versions of the Curry Paradox which concern validity. These, too,
are handled by Strategy 1.
Given some very weak assumptions about the conditional,14 the contrac-
tion inference, A ⇒ (A ⇒ B) ` A ⇒ B, is equivalent to the validity of
“pseudo modus-ponens” (PMP): (A ∧ (A ⇒ B)) ⇒ B. For suppose that
A ⇒ (A ⇒ B). Since A ⇒ A, it follows that A ⇒ (A ∧ (A ⇒ B)). Given
PMP and the transitivity of ⇒, A ⇒ B follows. Conversely, let us write C
for A ∧ (A⇒ B). Since C ⇒ A, (A⇒ B)⇒ (C ⇒ B). But C ⇒ (A⇒ B).
Hence by transitivity, C ⇒ (C ⇒ B). By the contraction inference, C ⇒ B.
14Namely, that it is at least as strong as the basic relevant logic B. See Priest (2008),
ch. 9.
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Now, let  express the relationship that A bears to B when A entails
B (that A entails that B).15 Then if MP is valid for the conditional of the
T -Schema, ⇒, we have (A ∧ (A ⇒ B))  B. It is natural to suppose that
valid inferences are truth preserving. That is, C  D ` C ⇒ D, and if this
is the case, we have (A ∧ (A ⇒ B)) ⇒ B, and we are back with the Curry
paradox. One solution to the paradox is to reject the necessary connection
between  and ⇒. But if the conditional of the T -Schema is material, the
failure of MP breaks the argument at the first step.
There are also versions of the Curry paradox involving a validity predicate
directly.16 These may also be solved by Strategy 1.
Let us write V (〈A〉 , 〈B〉) to express the claim that the one-premise infer-
ence from A to B is valid. Corresponding the the T -Schema, we have what
we might call the naive V-Schema:
V (〈A〉 , 〈B〉)⇔ (A B)
Given techniques of self-reference, we can construct a sentence D, of the form
V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉). We then have an argument whose core is as follows:
D
V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉) V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉)⇔ (D ⊥)
D D ⊥
⊥
D ⊥ V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉)⇔ (D ⊥)
V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉)
The line after the naked ⊥ is justified by the deduction of ⊥ from the as-
sumptions D, and discharges both of them. Hence we have an unconditional
15Formally,  may be taken to satisfy the two conditions:
A
...
B A A B
A B B
where the deduction in the first rule discharges A, and there are no other assumptions.
The rules are exactly what one would expect if A B is simply an object-language way
of expressing what a metalanguage deduction from A to B expresses.
16See, e.g., Beall and Murzi (2013).
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proof of V (〈D〉 , 〈⊥〉), which is D. Applying the V -Schema again gives us
D ⊥, and this, together with D gives us ⊥.
As in the standard Curry paradox, one kind of solution rejects Contrac-
tion. The line after the naked ⊥ can discharge only one occurrence of D. How
to articulate this solution, and, in particular, how to relate it to a semantic
definition of validity, is, however, a sensitive matter.17 A simpler solution
is to take the conditional of the V -Schema to be material. This breaks the
arguments where modus ponens is applied to it.
4.3 Infinitary Curry
Another version of the Curry Paradox which Strategy 1 easily solves is given
in Restall (2006). It is assumed that one can formulate the T -Schema as two
inferences:
τ ∧ T 〈A〉 ` A τ∧A` T 〈A〉
Thus, the T -Schema is taken to be enthymematically valid: some true back-
ground information, τ, may be necessary. (Of course, if one takes it to hold
non-enthymematically, then the enthymematic form will hold for any τ .) Re-
stall also assumes the existence of a conditional,→, satisfying the inferences:
A ∧B ` C A ` B → C
A ` B → C A ∧B ` C
Now let C be T 〈C〉 → ⊥. Then we have:
τ ∧ T 〈C〉 ` C
τ ∧ T 〈C〉 ` T 〈C〉 → ⊥
τ ∧ T 〈C〉 ∧ T 〈C〉 ` ⊥
τ ∧ T 〈C〉 ` ⊥
τ ` T 〈C〉 → ⊥
The rest of the argument then proceeds much as before, and we end up with
a proof of the unacceptable τ ` ⊥.
Perhaps the most obvious way to object to this argument is to deny the
existence of a meaningful connective, →, satisfying these introduction and
elimination rules. However, Restall points out that it would appear that one
can define such a conditional, B → C, as:
17See Priest (2015a).
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 4
71
• ∨{A : A ∧B ` C}
Here,
∨
is an infinitary disjunction. We may show that this satisfies the rules
as follows. Suppose that A′ ∧ B ` C. Then A′ ` ∨{A : A ∧ B ` C}, since
A′ ∈ {A : A ∧ B ` C}. Conversely, suppose that A′ ` B → C; that is, A′ `∨{A : A∧B ` C}. Then A′∧B ` B∧∨{A : A∧B ` C}, and by the infinitary
distribution of conjunction over disjunction, A′∧B ` ∨{A∧B : A∧B ` C}.
By the usual properties of disjunction,
∨{A ∧ B : A ∧ B ` C} ` C. So
A′ ∧B ` C, by transitivity.
Now, there are several ways one might object to this argument. The
most obvious is to reject infinitary operators altogether. → is just not a
humanly meaningful connective. One might reply that it is meaningful in a
more abstract sense. But this reply is also moot, since the definition of →
is circular. The set of which B → C is the infinite disjunction is defined
in terms of `. It therefore presupposes that this is well defined. But the
rules for ` include the rules for →, and therefore presuppose, amongst other
things, that the set which defines a conditional is well defined. The definition
of → is therefore a creative one, and does not guarantee it sense. As far as
this goes, it could be a tonk-like connective.
These considerations provide a solution to this Curry problem; but one
can, of course, debate them further. It is clear that the matter is not a simple
one. By contrast, Strategy 1 provides a simple and straightforward solution.
We have only T 〈A〉 ≡ A, or maybe enthymematically, τ ` T 〈A〉 ≡ A. We
do not have (τ∧)T 〈A〉 a` A(∧τ), so the argument fails at the first step since
≡ does not detach.
Indeed, given this solution, non-triviality can easily proved. Take the
language to be that of the relevant logic R with the logical constant t, plus
arithmetical vocabulary and the truth predicate. Consider a Routley/Meyer
interpretation, where the interpretation of the arithmetic language at the
base world is classical, and where the base world also verifies all sentences of
the form T 〈A〉!. This validates the material T -Schema. InR,→ is detachable
and contracting, and the conditional A 7→ B, defined as (A∧t)→ B, satisfies
the Restall rules.18
18As shown in Meyer (1973), this is the conditional of intuitionist logic.
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4.4 An Extended Paradox
Yet another paradox which is handled simply by Strategy 1, is an “extended
paradox” first formulated by Smiley.19 Define a function, V al, as follows,
where T is the truth predicate and F is the falsity predicate:
• V al 〈A〉 = {1} iff T 〈A〉 ∧ ¬F 〈A〉
• V al 〈A〉 = {1, 0} iff T 〈A〉 ∧ F 〈A〉
• V al 〈A〉 = {0} iff ¬T 〈A〉 ∧ F 〈A〉
Given that T 〈A〉∨¬T 〈A〉 and F 〈A〉∨¬F 〈A〉, one of these cases must hold;
and the three cases seem to be disjoint. Thus, e.g., if the first and the second
held, we would have F 〈A〉 ∧ ¬F 〈A〉. Now, by techniques of self-reference,
form a sentence S, of the form V al 〈S〉 = {0}. The T -Schema gives us that:
• T 〈S〉 ⇔ V al 〈S〉 = {0}
We have that V al 〈S〉 = {1} ∨ V al 〈S〉 = {1, 0} ∨ V al 〈S〉 = {0}. In the first
two cases, T 〈S〉. So by the T -Schema, V al 〈S〉 = {0}. So either {1} = {0},
or {1} = {1, 0}, and so 0 = 1. In the third case, by the T -Schema, T 〈S〉.
Hence, V al 〈S〉 = {1} ∨ V al 〈S〉 = {1, 0}, so again 0 = 1. Hence, 0 = 1, and
all sentences have the same value.
Priest (1993) and IC, 20.3, argue that the argument fails, since the three
cases in the definition of V al are not exclusive. In paradoxical cases, two
or more of the defining cases may hold. (Thus, if L is ¬T 〈L〉, we have
T 〈L〉∧¬T 〈L〉. But if L is not true, it is false, so we have F 〈A〉 as well, and
we are in the second and third cases.) So V al is ill-defined. Strategy 1 gives
an even simpler solution, however. If ⇔ is ≡, the detachments involved in
applying the T -Schema break down.
4.5 Denotation Paradoxes
Let us now turn to the paradoxes of denotation. These are a very distinctive
subclass of the self-referential paradoxes: first, because they require, essen-
tially, description terms of some kind, and some principle concerning how
these behave; secondly, because the standard paradoxical arguments in these
cases do not go via biconditionals of the form A⇔ ¬A, but give independent
19Smiley (1993).
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arguments for each of A and ¬A. Such arguments do not then need to invoke
the LEM essentially.20
For the most part, the paradoxes of denotation are handled very easily
by a dialetheic strategy. The arguments are sound, and the contradictory
conclusions simply true. But there is a paradox in this family which cannot
obviously be solved in this way. This is an argument first produced by
Hilbert and Bernays to show that a consistent theory cannot contain its own
denotation function (just as Tarski employed the Liar Paradox to show that
a consistent theory cannot contain its own truth predicate).21
An informal version of the paradox goes as follows. Consider a term, t,
of the form: the denotation of ‘t’ plus one). ‘t’ denotes t, but it also denotes
t+ 1. Hence t = t+ 1, and so 0 = 1.
Formally, let f be any one-place functional term. By techniques of self-
reference, we can find a term, t, such that t = f(〈t〉).22 Now let  be an
indefinite description operator, satisfying the Description Principle: ∃xA `
Ax(xA).
23 Let D be the denotation relation, and consider the functional
term f(yD(x, y)). By what we have just seen, we can find a term, t, such
that:
(0) t = f(yD(〈t〉 , y))
We can now reason as follows:
20See Priest (2006a).
21For full discussion and references, see Priest (2005), ch. 8.
22Thus, suppose that we are operating in arithmetic, and naming is given by go¨del
coding. Suppose, also, that we have a function symbol, δ, such that for any term, t,
δ(〈t〉) is the diagonalisation of t—that is, (the code of) the term t with the code of term t
replacing every free variable. Consider the term f(δ(x)); call this s. Its diagonalisation is
f(δ(〈s〉); call this t. Then δ(〈s〉) = 〈t〉. So f(δ(〈s〉)) = f 〈t〉. So t = f 〈t〉.
23For the application at hand, it might well be thought that a definite description
operator could be used. However, to keep matters as simple as possible, we use indefinite
descriptions.
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 4
74
(1) t = t Identity
(2) D(〈t〉 , t) Denotation Schema (and MP)
(3) ∃yD(〈t〉 , y) Generalisation
(4) D(〈t〉 , yD(〈t〉 , y)) Description Principle
(5) t = yD(〈t〉 , y) Denotation Scheme (and MP)
(6) t = f(t) Substituting (5) in (0)
In particular, suppose we are quantifying over natural numbers, and for f
take the “zero function”, ζ: ζ(0) = 1, and ζ(n) = 0 if n > 0. Then t = ζ(t).
If t = 0 then ζ(t) = 1; so 0=1. If t > 0 then ζ(t) = 0 = t, so 0 = 1, again.
Now, there are various solutions to this paradox one might attempt. One
is to reject the D-Schema, by stratification, or in some other way. That is
not an option if we accept the naive semantic principles. Another is to hold
that t has no denotation. However, this does not work, since we can arrange
for all -terms to have a denotation (a` la Hilbert). Priest (2005), ch. 8,
argues that the correct solution is to take t to have multiple denotations.
The natural semantics shows that the Substitutivity of Identicals (step (6))
then fails. Taking the D-Schema to be a material conditional provides a
much simpler solution, however. The argument fails at lines (2) and (5).
Indeed, the non-triviality proof of this approach is as simple as before.
Take a classical model of arithmetic plus the denotation predicate, in which
arithmetic is standard and the extension and anti-extension of D are both
the set of all pairs of objects in the domain. This validates the D-Schema.
Now extend this to a model of Hilbert’s -operator (by the addition of a
choice function).24 This still validates the D-Schema (however -terms are
coded); but it also validates the Description Principle, and is a conservative
extension.
4.6 Kripke’s Paradox
Another paradox of self-reference to note in this context is one proposed by
Kripke (2011). Let k be the set of all times, t, when I am thinking about a set
of times of which t is not a member. I can think about this at time τ . τ is and
is not, then, a member of k. This is obviously a paradox of a kind similar to
Russell’s paradox, but it uses an intentional notion, think of, and standard
24As in Leisenring (1969).
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solutions to the set-theoretic paradoxes do not apply to it. In particular,
since—identifying times with real numbers—k is a set of real numbers, one
cannot say that it does not exist. And even if it did, this appears to be
irrelevant, since I obviously can think about non-existent objects, such as
Zeus.
Though we will not turn to set theory till the next part of this essay,
let us look at this paradox and its relation to Strategy 1 now. Much of the
detail of Kripke’s example is, in fact, unnecessary to the paradox. In Priest
(2015b), I strip it down to the following.
Let θ(x) be ‘I am thinking about x (now)’. Let k = {n < 1 : ∃s ⊆
1(θ(s) ∧ n /∈ s)}, where the variable n ranges over natural numbers. Clearly
either k = ∅ or k = {0}. We have:
• 0 ∈ k ⇔ ∃s ⊆ 1(θ(s) ∧ 0 /∈ s)
Given the empirical premise that I am (now) thinking about k and only k,
then θ(x) iff x = k. Hence:
• 0 ∈ k ⇔ θ(k) ∧ 0 /∈ k
Given that ⇔ is detachable, we then have that 0 ∈ k!. So either 0 ∈ ∅ or
0 /∈ {0}.
Now, while there are ways in which we can make sense of this,25 it is hard
to suppose that such simple and small sets are contradictory. However, if ⇔
is the material biconditional, we have only that 0 ∈ k! ∨ ¬θ(k). And given
the empirical premise: 0 ∈ k! ∨ ¬θ(k)!. The purely set-theoretic statement
can, then, have a quite consistent value (false), provided that it is the second
disjunct which is true: I am and am not (now) thinking about k.
Odd though this may seem at first, it is of a piece with many of the other
paradoxes of self-reference. Thus, Ko¨nig’s paradox tells us that a certain
number both can and cannot be referred to. To think of something is to
refer to it mentally. So, in a similar way, k both can and cannot be thought
of.
5 Endorsement
Let us now look at the negative side of the ledger more closely: the failure
of ⊃ to detach, as it would seem to have to, if truth is to play a role in
25See Priest (2015b).
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endorsement.
5.1 Transparent Truth
A very simple way of solving the problem is to endorse the transparency of
truth, that is, the view that A and T〈A〉 are intersubstitutable in all contexts:
BC(A)
BC(T 〈A〉)
where the double line indicates a two-way inference. Let us call this pair
of rules Transparency. An obvious special case of Transparency is what we
might call the T -rules:
A
T 〈A〉
These rules are weaker, though. They do not entail the “negative” T -rules:
¬A
¬T 〈A〉
As is not hard to show, the T -rules and negated T -rules do deliver intersub-
stitutivity in all extensional contexts (i.e., those of LP ). In particular, since
 A ≡ A, they deliver the material T -Schema  A ≡ T 〈A〉. They do not
deliver a transparent truth predicate if the contexts involved are intentional,
however, such as  or a relevant→. The rules require A and T 〈A〉 to relate
to the same truth values at the “base world” of a world-semantics. This does
not guarantee intersubstitutivity in intensional contexts (i.e., ones whose se-
mantic evaluation at a world requires a world-shift). For that, we need to
enforce the connection between A and T 〈A〉 at other worlds.
Now, Transparency—or just the positive T -rules—does solve the problem
of endorsement. Thus, in the first example of 3.2, once we have inferred that
‘There is a time for every purpose under heaven’ is true, the result follows.
Similarly for the second example of 3.2.
Matters are the same when the truth predicate is used in an infinitary
act of endorsement. Thus, in the third example of 3.2, once we have inferred
T 〈∀x x′ 6= 0〉, we can use the rules to infer ∀x x′ 6= 0.
The addition of Transparency, moreover, produces a non-trivial extension
in the extensional language. This can be proved by a standard fixed-point
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construction. We start with a model of arithmetic, where both the extension
and anti-extension of T are the whole domain, N . We then ascend the ordi-
nals, at successor stages setting the extension and anti-extension of T to be
the set of (codes of) things true/false at the previous stage; and at limit ordi-
nals taking intersections. Because of the Monotonicity Lemma, the extension
and anti-extension of the truth predicate are non-increasing. Hence, we reach
a fixed-point interpretation, where the extension and anti-extension of T are
exactly the (codes of) the things true/false in the interpretation. Full details
can be found in Priest (2002a), 8.1.
What effect does the addition of Transparency have on the positives for
Strategy 1 discussed in Section 4? The Curry paradox and the Validity Curry
are solved exactly as before, as is shown by the fixed-point construction:
detachment fails for the relevant conditional. The addition has no relevance
to Kripke’s paradox. It does spoil the solution to the paradoxes of 4.3-4.5,
however, since these arguments can all be run using the positive T -rules, or
their analogue for denotation:
t = c
D(〈t〉 , c)
The only solutions for these would then seem to be of a different kind: the
ones indicated in the discussion of those sections.
5.2 Propositional Quantification
A rather different way of addressing the concerns engendered by endorsement
is to cut out the middle-man entirely, and use propositional quantification.
For example, in the first case of 3.2, we can then say:
• ∀p(the Bible says that p⇒ p)
from which, by universal instantiation, we can infer: The Bible says that
there is a time for every purpose under heaven ⇒ there is a time for every
purpose under heaven. Given that we may move from the antecedent to the
consequent in some way, we can then infer that there is a time for every
purpose under heaven.
The second example of 3.2 can be treated in the same way. We have:
• ∀p(p⇒ the Bible says that p).
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From which we can infer: People have evolved ⇒ the Bible says that people
have evolved. Modus ponens does the rest. The third example of 3.2 can also
be dealt with in the same way. The endorsement is expressed as:
• ∀p(some axiom of PA says that p⇒ p)
Given only that an axiom of PA says that ∀x x′ 6= 0, the result follows.
The machinery of propositional quantification is easily added to that at
hand.26 We add two propositional constants, 1 and 0, a stock of propositional
variables, and the propositional quantifiers, ∀ and ∃. The truth/falsity con-
ditions are then extended as follows:
• + 1 and − 0
• + ∃pA iff + Ap(1) or + Ap(0)
• − ∃pA iff − Ap(1) and − Ap(0)
• + ∀pA iff + Ap(1) and + Ap(0)
• − ∀pA iff − Ap(1) or − Ap(0)
Note that we do not insist that 1 is not false (as well as true), or that 0 is not
true (as well as false). The proof of substitutivity for material equivalents is
easily extended to the new context.
It is now easy enough to establish that the quantifiers behave as one
would wish. Let B be any formula. Then in any interpretation + B ≡ 1
or + B ≡ 0. Suppose the former; the latter is similar. Then if + ∀pA,
+ Ap(1). So by the substitutivity of equivalents, + Ap(B). Hence, ∀pA |=
Ap(B). By an analagous argument, Ap(B) |= ∃pA.27
The addition of the machinery of propositional quantification obviously
produces a conservative extension (since any counter-model of an inference
in the original language can be extended to a counter-model in the extended
language). Hence, the non-triviality arguments already given carry over to
the new context. And, unlike the addition of T -rules the extension does
nothing to destabilise any of the paradox solutions discussed in Section 4.
26Many people feel uncomfortable about propositional quantification. Some of this may
be eased just by noting that the propositional quantifiers are just zero-adic second-order
quantifiers.
27If there are intensional operators in the language, a more sophisticated semantics is
required. This can be found in Priest (2009b), 2.1.
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6 An Additional Conditional?
So much for the obvious issues. There are, however, other, less obvious
aspects of Strategy 1 to be looked at. In this and the next two sections we
consider three of these.
6.1 Truth and a Detachable Conditional
The conditional of the T -Schema is, according to Strategy 1, material. This
does not prevent there being a detachable conditional, →, in the language
(such as the connective of 4.2). The Curry argument still fails, even if →
contracts. Thus, we can formulate the sentence, C, of the form T 〈C〉 → ⊥,
but the Curry argument of 4.1 still fails at the MP steps for the T -Schema.
Indeed, such a conditional can be added conservatively to the language.
We take the interpretation of 3.1 as the base world of model for S5. The
strict conditional (which detaches and contracts) is given truth conditions in
the usual way (A→ B is true at a world iff at every world where A is true,
B is true); but only the material T -Schema is delivered. (In particular, it is
not delivered in the form of a strict biconditional.)
A fully transparent truth predicate does, however, rule out a detachable
conditional—at least if it validates A ↔ A. For then, transparency delivers
A ↔ T 〈A〉, and we move from Strategy 1 to Strategy 2. Thus, Strategy 1
and a transparent truth predicate requires that there be no such conditional.
6.2 Quasi-Validity
Having no other conditional raises a substantial problem, however. The
material conditional does not detach. Transparency may solve the problem
as concerns the T -Schema, but what of all the other places where we deploy
a conditional? We can never apply modus ponens !
There is a way in which one might attempt to get around this problem,
however.28 This is to take material detachment, and, more generally, clas-
sically valid inferences that are not valid in LP—quasi-valid inferences—as
acceptable default inferences. Counterexamples to these inferences arise, we
know, only when dialetheias occur at strategic places in the reasoning. Given
that in ordinary reasoning such things are statistically uncommon, they have
28Which might also be used to handle some occasions where one might want to detach
with a material T -Schema.
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low a priori probability; we are therefore justified in proceeding on the as-
sumption that we are not dealing with them, and using classical logic. Given
some dog which we have no reason to believe to be unusual, we are entitled to
take it to have four legs—until we learn otherwise—since dogs are normally
four-legged. Similarly, when reasoning about a situation, we are entitled to
take it to be consistent, until we learn otherwise.29
Of course, sometimes we will learn otherwise: we may obtain evidence
that dialetheias are involved in the reasoning. We will then have to review
and possibly revise our belief in the things established with quasi-valid rea-
soning. What has been established is therefore fallible. We do not have to
reject everything established in this way, however. Thus, if we had inferred
B from A and A ⊃ B, and we have no particular reason to suppose that A
is a dialetheia, there is no reason to revise our belief in B. In other words,
we may move from an assumption of global consistency to one of local con-
sistency. Of course, disentangling where and how things we have reason to
believe dialetheic are involved in our reasoning will be a messy and, no doubt,
itself fallible matter. Perhaps all one can do is leave things as a matter of
informal judgment.30
However, there is a way of turning this whole process of reasoning into
something more determinate. This is to use a non-monotonic logic which
implements the default of consistency (both locally and globally). A non-
monotonic logic is one where a valid inference may fail, given further infor-
mation. That is, we may have Σ ` A but Σ ∪ Π 0 A. Fallibility due to new
information is, then, built into the very notion of logical consequence. I will
describe one such logic, LPm, in the next subsection.31
29The strategy is defended in detail in IC, ch. 8, and 19.10. If one endorses a dialetheic
solution to the sorites paradox, as I will discuss in 15.6, it might be objected that since
vague predicates are a commonplace in natural language, so would dialetheias be; and
contradiction-freedom is not the norm. This does not follow, however. Take a vague
predicate, such as ‘red’. The vast majority of objects are not red, and consistently so. It
follows that the collection of objects which are red and not red are a very small proportion
of the total. Again, according to IC, motion produces contradictions; since motion is
everywhere, it might be argued that contradictions are ubiquitous. The contradictions in
motion concern instantaneous states, however—or at least states of very short duration;
and normal reasoning rarely concerns such states.
30If I understand it right, this is the view recently adopted by Beall. See, e.g., Beall
(2011) and (2013b).
31For what follows, see IC, ch. 16.
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6.3 LPm
Given any LP interpretation, M, let:
• M!= {A : A is of the form Pkd1 ...kdn , and M is a model of A!}
Here the kd’s are the canonical names for the members of the domain. M!
records the set of contradictory atomic “facts” in M. This provides a simple
and natural measure of its inconsistency. Given two LP interpretations, M,
N, define M<mN to mean that M!⊂N!. Here, ‘⊂’ is proper subsethood.
M<mN expresses the fact that that M is more consistent than N. Say that
M is a minimally inconsistent (mi) model of Σ if:
• M is a model of Σ
• and if N<m M then N is not a model of Σ
Finally, say that A is a minimally inconsistent consequence of Σ, Σ m A,
iff:
• every mi model of Σ is a model of A
Thus, to determine the mi consequences of a set, Σ, we ignore all those
interpretations that are more inconsistent than Σ requires us to suppose. In
this way, we implement the default assumption of consistency.
LPm validates inferences that LP does not. Thus, let us write p for
Pa, q for Qb, and r for Rc. Then {p,¬p ∨ q} m q, since the mi models
of the premises are just the classical models. Similarly, r is irrelevant to
the inference, so we have {r!, p,¬p ∨ q} m q. The premises require r to be
inconsistent, but not p. m bears all the marks of a non-monotonic conse-
quence relation. Additional information can invalidate an inference, and it
is not closed under uniform substitution. Thus, it is not difficult to show
that {¬p, p,¬p ∨ q} 2m q and {p,¬p ∨ q!} 2m q! Crucially, however, if Σ is
consistent (either classically or in LP , it makes not difference, as we observed
in fn. 10) then Σ m A iff Σ CL A, since the mi models of Σ are just its
classical models. (M is classical iff M! = ∅.) We see, at any rate, that,
using LPm, we can use the disjunctive syllogism (detachment for ⊃) when
reasoning from (locally) consistent information.
On a more technical note, IC, ch. 16, claims that if Σ is non-trivial under
LP consequence, it is non-trivial under LPm consequence. This is called
Reassurance. The claim is false, as Crabbe´ (2011) shows. Thus, if Σ =
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{∀x(Px!∨Qx!),∃x(Px!∧Qx!)}, Σ does not entail ∀xPx in LP , but its only
mi model (up to isomorphism) has one element which satisfies both Px! and
Qx!. It is not difficult to show that in this interpretation all sentences are
true.32
Now, even without Reassurance, LPm would seem to do everything that
one would like: it delivers a more generous notion of consequence than LP ,
where irrelevant contradictions do not invalidate classical inferences, and
which delivers all classical consequences given consistent premises.33 None
the less, there is a very simple way to obtain Reassurance.34 One can simply
change the definition of mi consequence to be as follows. Σ m A iff:
• some mi model of Σ is non-trivial, and every mi model of Σ is a model
of A
• every mi model of Σ is trivial,35 and Σ  A
Reassurance follows simply, and m still has all the crucial properties.
I note that an approach to minimal inconsistency, slightly different from
the one just described, is endorsed by Batens (who founded this whole area
of research). This has consequences which might well be thought to make it
more attractive. The approach defines M!, not as above, but as {[∃](A∧¬A) :
M is a model of [∃](A∧¬A)}, where, here, [∃]B is the sentence obtained by
prefixing B with a particular quantifier, ∃x, for every variable, x, free in B.
32The mistake arose as follows. Originally (Priest (1991)), the definition of M<mN
required M and N to have the same domain. For this definition of <m, the proof is
correct. However, as Batens observed, given this definition, there can be consistent sets
which have non-classical mi models. Thus, {∃xPx,∃x¬Px} has a one-element model in
which the only object satisfies Px!. It is not difficult to see that this is mi. When, to
avoid this consequence, the definition of <m was changed to the present one in the second
edition of IC, I failed to observe that the proof of Lemma 3 (p. 229) now fails.
33The reason given in IC, 16.6, for the desirability of Reassurance is as follows. Taking
triviality to be a mark of incoherence, Reassurance guarantees that a coherent situation
will never be turned into an incoherent one under LPm. This may be more than is
required, though. It might be quite sufficient if mostly, or normally, LPm does not turn a
non-trivial situation into a trivial one. If there are some exceptions, and LPm is otherwise
robust, we might take the triviality exposed to speak against the coherence of the original
situation.
34Crabbe´ (2011) and (2012) also contain observations concerning how Reassurance can
be restored.
35Which of course includes the case in which it has none.
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Using this definition, one can prove that for any model, M, there is an mi
N <m M; so, in particular, Reassurance holds.
36
Let me end this section with a comment on truth. As we saw in 3.1, there
is a model of the material T -schema which guarantees its non-triviality. In
this, the extension and the anti-extension of the truth predicate are both the
whole domain. In other words, every sentence of the form T 〈A〉! is true. As
an account of truth itself, this model is completely implausible: truth should
not be that inconsistent! What is a more plausible model like? One answer
is provided by the construction of 5.1. We saw there how to construct a
model in which truth is inconsistent only for ungrounded sentences. This
construction does validate the T -inferences, however—which one may not
want for reasons, some of which we have already seen, and others of which
are soon to appear.
Another approach to the matter is provided by the material in the present
section. A natural thought is that our theory of truth (or anything else, for
that matter) should minimise inconsistency. Contradictions should not be
multiplied beyond necessity (as IC, 8.4 puts it). If this is the case, then the
natural interpretations of the truth predicate are the mi ones (at least with
respect to the truth predicate). Whether LPm has such interpretations is still
an open question; on the Batens approach we know that there are. Of course,
if there are mi interpretations, there may be more than one. In this case,
we would require some further constraint on truth to select from amongst
them. Alternatively, however, one might just accept that the behaviour of the
truth predicate is radically under-determined: truth may behave differently
in different “universes”. This view of truth is of a piece with the “multiverse”
view of set theory: there is no unique universe of sets: there is a multiverse
of such. We will return to this matter when we turn to set theory in the
third part of this essay.
6.4 The Material Conditional
Using LPm or something like it may, then, get around some of the issues
to do with the non-detachability of the material conditional. However, there
are other issues arising from having the material conditional as one’s only
conditional connective.
The first concerns fallibilism. If we have no detachable conditional avail-
36See Batens (2000).
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able, there is then no way of expressing indefeasible conditionality. We can
apply detachment to any conditional claim only using LPm or some other
defeasible mechanism. But there is no way of ensuring a non-defeasible con-
ditional connection.
This may well be seen as a problem. However, it is not clear to me that it
is. The whole trend of the philosophy of science in the last 80 years has been
towards fallibilism.37 The positivists were forced to accept that verification
was always a fallible process. A well corroborated theory could turn out to
be false. The fallibility of our empirical observations forced the realisation
that falsification is also fallible. In the end, it might be our data that is
wrong. This is theory-laden and itself fallible. Thus, all empirical belief is
fallible. Indeed, any area in which we theorise is fallible for exactly the same
reasons: theory always outruns data, which is, in any case, soft. The matter
is no different in our theorisation about logic.38
Dialetheism already reinforces the fallibilist picture, since it allows for
the possibility that it may not always be rational to discard an inconsistent
theory.39 Having only the material conditional at our disposal just ratchets
the story up a notch. All detachment is fallible too. This is not to say that
it is useless. Fallible conditions (such as: if there are thunder clouds, it is
going to rain) are conditions none the less. But it is to say that we may
always have to go back and retract the conclusions reached by detachment
in the light of new information—specifically, in this case, that we are in (or
may well be in) an inconsistent situation. This is not something that should
upset any good fallibilist, though. Indeed, they should welcome the support
for their general view.
Unfortunately, there is a second, and I think, more significant problem
with having only the material conditional at one’s disposal. This is that the
material conditional is a poor candidate for representing a natural language
if. The problem is not that it is too weak, but that it is too strong. It validates
too many inferences which are not plausible for an indicative conditional, let
alone a subjunctive conditional (assuming there to be a difference, which I
doubt40). And going paraconsistent does little to help.
Standard discussions focus on the old war horses:
37The story is nicely told in Chalmers (1999).
38See Priest (2014), (2016).
39See IC, p. 106-7, and Priest (2006b), Part 3.
40See Priest (201+).
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• A  B ⊃ A
• ¬A  A ⊃ B
suggesting why these inferences are not as bad as they appear. These sug-
gestions hardly work in their own terms.41 But they can deal at best with
“naked conditionals”—ones not in the scope of some other operator. The
most telling objections concern non-naked conditionals. There is a whole
host of problematic inferences (which are strangely absent in the standard
discussions of the matter). Routley et al (1982), 1.2, has a list of 16 such
inferences. Most of these are equally valid for the paraconsistent material
conditional. I reproduce a few of these here.
• ¬(A ⊃ B)  A [It’s not the case that if there is a good god then the
prayers of evil people will be answered. So there is a good god.]
• ¬(A ⊃ B)  ¬A ⊃ B [It’s not the case that if you break the mirror
you will have bad luck. So if you don’t break the mirror you will have
bad luck.]
• (A ⊃ B) ∧ (C ⊃ D)  (A ⊃ D) ∨ (C ⊃ B) [If John is in Paris then he
is in France, and if John is in Istanbul then he is in Turkey. So either,
if he is in Paris then he is in Turkey, or if he is in Istanbul then he is
in Paris.]
• (A∧B) ⊃ C  ((A∧¬B) ⊃ C)∨ ((¬A∨B) ⊃ C) [If a (a quadrilateral)
has equal angles and equal sides it is a square. So either, if a has equal
angles and does not have equal sides it is a square, or if a does not have
equal angles and has equal sides it is a square.]
• C  (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) [He’s an anarchist. So if he is smiling he has
a bomb in his pocket, or if he has a bomb in his pocket he is smiling.]
The indicative conditional is not, then, a material conditional. Real con-
ditionals are not truth functional. And if we do need a non-material condi-
tional, why not suppose it to be detachable if one can indeed have such a
thing?
41See, for example, Priest (2009), which discusses Jackson’s account of the matter—one
of the most sophisticated.
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7 A Consistency Operator
7.1 What This is
The next relevant issue concerns a consistency operator.42 Consider a monadic
operator, ◦, with the following truth/falsity conditions:
• if + A and − A then − ◦A and it is not the case that + ◦A
• otherwise, + ◦A and it is not the case that − ◦A
Given the use of t, f , b, the behaviour of ◦ may be helpfully depicted by the
following truth table:
A ◦A
t t
b f
f t
Note that ◦A,A!  B. So B∨A!, ◦A  B. Note also that ◦ is not monotonic.
Though consistency operators have long been a feature of some para-
consistent traditions—especially, following da Costa, the Brazillian tradi-
tion43—they have not been popular with those who want to retain an unre-
stricted T -Schema or Abstraction principle. The reason for this is that the
consistency operator allows us to define a “strong negation”, †A: ¬A ∧ ◦A.
It is easy enough to check that its truth table is as follows.
A †A
t f
b f
f t
Now, † behaves just like negation in classical propositional logic. In fact,
the ∨-∧-† fragment of the logic is exactly classical logic.44 This generates
42This is not considered by Goodship. I am grateful to Hitoshi Omori for emphasising
to me the importance of a consistency operator in the present context. See, e.g., Omori
(2015).
43See, e.g., Carniell, Coniglio, and Marcos (2007).
44Any classical counter-model is obviously a paraconsistent counter-model. Given an
LP counter-model, define an interpretation which is the same, except that any parameter
which takes the value b, takes the value t. A simple induction shows that any sentence
that has the value t or b in the old model has the value t in the new one; and any sentence
that has the value f in the old model has the value f in this one. Hence, this is a classical
counter-model.
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two problems. The first is this. If there is an operator that behaves as does
classical negation (“Boolean negation”), †, one might be tempted to argue
that paraconsistent negation is not really negation at all. Real negation is
†; ¬ is just some other odd functor. In particular, then, there can be no
true contradictions. Secondly, and relatedly, there is a liar sentence, L†,
of the form †T 〈L†〉. The T -Schema then gives T 〈L†〉 ⇔ †T 〈L†〉. If ⇔
detaches then, since T
〈
L†
〉 ∨ †T 〈L†〉, we have T 〈L†〉 ∧ †T 〈L†〉; and since
T
〈
L†
〉 ∧ †T 〈L†〉 ` B, we have triviality.45
Neither of these concerns is a serious worry in the present context, how-
ever. The definition of † employs the consistency operator and its semantics;
and b, after all, means ‘both true and false’. So the meaning of † is predicated
on the assumption that some things are dialetheias. Moreover, ¬ toggles be-
tween truth and falsity, just as one should require of negation; † does not.
And concerning the †Liar, once the T -scheme is taken as a material bi-
conditional, triviality does not arise. Indeed, exactly the same simple non-
triviality proof given in 3.1 works. We just take the extension and anti-
extension of T to contain all (codes of) formulas. The material T -Schema
is then verified. Moreover, one can have restricted forms of the T -rules.
A,A ⊃ T 〈A〉  T 〈A〉∨A!. Given the logical truth of the material T -Schema,
A, ◦A  T 〈A〉. In the reverse direction, T 〈A〉 , T 〈A〉 ⊃ A  A ∨ T 〈A〉!. So,
given the logical truth of the material T -Schema, T 〈A〉 , ◦T 〈A〉  A. Since
the T -Schema contraposes, and ◦B is logically equivalent to ◦¬B we have,
similarly: ¬A, ◦A  ¬T 〈A〉 and ¬T 〈A〉 , ◦T 〈A〉  ¬A.
What one cannot have, if one has a consistency operator, are the positive
T -rules—and a fortiori, Transparency. For since L† a` †T 〈L†〉, T 〈L†〉 a`
†T 〈L†〉; and since T 〈L†〉 ∨ †T 〈L†〉 ` T 〈L†〉 ∧ †T 〈L†〉, we are back with
triviality.46 One can have them in a restricted form, slightly stronger than
the above, however. Return to the fixed-point construction of 5.1. We start
with the extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate each as the whole
domain. We then ascend the ordinals, except this time, at successor stages,
the extension of the truth predicate comprises all the ◦-free sentences that are
true at the previous stage plus all the sentences containing ◦; and the anti-
extension of the truth predicate comprises all the ◦-free sentences that are
45For this reason, Priest (2006b), ch. 5, argues that Boolean Negation either does not
behave as one might suppose, or else it is a tonk-like operator.
46In particular, then, the dual strategy is not open to Field (2008). In the dual case,
◦A would express the claim that A is not “gappy” or defective. But the detachability of
the T -Schema rules out the possibility of deploying this construction.
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false at the previous stage plus all the sentences containing ◦. As far as ◦-free
formulas go, things are the same as before. In particular, we reach a fixed-
point interpretation where these are in the extension/anti-extension of the
truth predicate iff they hold in the interpretation. All sentences containing ◦
are, however, in both the extension and the anti-extension of T . The material
T -Schema is validated at the fixed point, as are the rules: A ` T 〈A〉, and
¬A ` ¬T 〈A〉. (If A is ◦-free, this is because of the fixed point. If A contains
◦, the conclusion always holds.) It does not validate the rules in the other
direction, though: T 〈A〉 ` A and ¬T 〈A〉 ` ¬A. These hold if A is ◦-
free, but may obviously fail otherwise. (Though of course, we still have
◦T 〈A〉 , T 〈A〉 ` A and ◦T 〈A〉 ,¬T 〈A〉 ` ¬A.)47
7.2 Classical Recapture
According to dialetheism, some situations are contradictory; but many, of
course, are not. In standard mathematics, for example, we are normally
reasoning about consistent situations. A natural thought is that, provided
we are reasoning about consistent situations, it is perfectly fine to use classical
logic. After all, if we take the space of LP interpretations, and delete the
inconsistent ones, what remains is exactly the space of interpretations for
classical logic.
The problem is how, exactly, to make sense of this thought. Provided that
we stick to the vocabulary of LP , there is no set of sentences, ∆, that one can
add to a bunch of premises to ensure that only the consistent interpretations
are to be considered. ∆ might itself be inconsistent.48
Going non-monotonic, as in LPm is one way around this. But if we
have a consistency operator at our disposal, we can frame such a ∆. On the
propositional level, let Π be the set of propositional parameters that occur
in Σ∪{A}. Then we may take ∆ to be {◦p : p ∈ Π}. At the first-order level,
let Π be the set of predicates that occur in some sentence in Σ ∪ {A}. We
may take ∆ to be {∀x1...∀xn ◦Pnx1...xn : Pn is an n-adic predicate in Π}. In
both cases it is routine to prove that if the formulas in Σ∪{A} are expressed
in the language of classical logic:
• ∆ ∪ Σ LP A iff Σ CL A
47I note also that results of Batens explained in 6.3 carry over to a language with a
consistency operator.
48See IC, ch. 8.
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Classical reasoning can always, then, be interpreted enthymematically.
Another way to see this is as follows. Let ◦Σ = {◦A : A ∈ Σ}. Then
if Σ CL A then Σ ∪ ◦Σ LP A. For suppose that Σ CL A, then by the
Compactness Theorem, there are B1, ..., Bn ∈ Σ such that {B1, ..., Bn} CL
A. Let B be the conjunction of these Bs. Then B CL A, and CL B ⊃ A.
Since LP has the same logical truths as classical logic, it follows that LP
B ⊃ A. Since Σ LP B, Σ LP B! ∨ A. But ◦Σ LP ◦B1 ∧ ... ◦ Bn. So
◦Σ LP ◦B. Hence, Σ ∪ ◦Σ LP A.
7.3 True Only
There is a certain interesting family of interdefinable notions. This includes
being true and true only (to), being false and false only (fo), being consistent
(con). Thus, a sentence is fo iff its negation is to, and it is con iff it is fo or
to. And a sentence is to if it is con and true.
Perhaps the objection made most frequently to a dialetheic solution to
the semantic paradoxes is that a dialethist cannot express any of the notions
in this family—on pain of extended paradoxes.49 Thus put, the claims is
patently false. A dialetheist can express the claims in question in those
very words, e.g.: x is fo iff Fx ∧ ¬Tx. Nor do extended paradoxes framed
in terms of these notions generate triviality (as any of the standard non-
triviality proofs show).
The usual reply is that those words do not express the thought that a
sentence is really to, fo, or con, since something might be to and false as well,
or con and inconsistent as well. Indeed, the usual liar sentence generates such
a situation, as we noted in 4.4.
As a moment’s thought will attest, though, this has now changed the
objection. It is no longer that con and its cognates cannot be expressed; it
is that they cannot be expressed consistently. Despite the fact that many
people would like to be able to do this, liking is not a proof of possibility; and
it is not clear that being able to do this actually buys anything significant.
No one, to my knowledge, has ever made a case for this.
In particular, the ability to express consistency consistently certainly
doesn’t provide a way of forcing things to be consistent. Nobody, not even an
explosive logician, can do that. It would have helped Frege not one iota to
add to the axioms of his Grundgesetze an extra axiom to the effect that his
49For references and discussion, see IC, 20.4.
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theory was consistent. The theory would still have been inconsistent—and
now doubly so. What a classical logician can do is ensure that any incon-
sistency collapses into triviality. (Indeed, given that their logic is explosive,
they do not have to work very hard at this!) But given a detachable con-
ditional, →, a paraconsistent logician can do the same, by endorsing the
Schema A!→ ⊥. Indeed, they have a more discriminating possibility. They
can express the thought that the inconsistency of a particular sentence, A0,
will induce triviality, by endorsing the sentence A0!→ ⊥.50
Given a consistency operator, there is an even simpler way of doing this,
with the Schema ◦A, or an instance, ◦A0. Moreover, to whatever extent it is
desirable, a consistency operator does allow one to express consistency and
it cognates consistently. (‘x is to’ is expressed by A ∧ ◦A; and ‘x is fo’ is
expressed by ¬A ∧ ◦A.) Thus, ◦A expresses the consistency of A in a way
that should keep even the most rabid of classical logicians happy.
8 Restricted Quantification
8.1 The Problem
The matter of a consistency operator brings us to third important issue:
restricted quantification. Much reasoning employs restricted quantifiers of
the form: ‘Some P s are Qs’, and ‘All P s are Qs’. In classical logic these are,
of course, represented as:
(1) ∃x(Px ∧Qx)
(2) ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
and these renditions work pretty well. They deliver the validity of the sort
of inferences that one might expect, including the connections between the
restricted universal and particular quantifiers.
Once we move to a paraconsistent context, matters are somewhat differ-
ent. The rendition of the restricted particular quantifier as (1) is perfectly
fine. But the rendition of the restricted universal quantifier as (2) appears
not to be. The reason is pretty obvious: one looses the validity of perhaps the
50Indeed, we may dispense with the detachable conditional if we just adopt the inferential
rules A! ` ⊥ or A0! ` ⊥, as suggested by Beall (2013a).
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most obvious and frequently used inference concerning restricted quantifiers:
Pa; all P s are Qs. Hence Qa.
since this is a version of the disjunctive syllogism: Pa,∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) ` Qa.
The move that is usually made in this context is to replace ⊃ with some
detachable conditional, →, often a relevant one.51 Whilst such a move deliv-
ers many of the inferences concerning restricted quantifiers which one might
expect, they do not deliver others. In particular, the intensional nature of→
is bound to invalidate some of the natural connections between the different
quantifiers. Thus take, for example: Everything is Q; so all P s are Qs:
• ∀xQx ` ∀x(Px→ Qx)
The information delivered by the premise is just too weak to deliver the
intensional connection required by the conclusion.
8.2 Solution by the Consistency Operator
Perhaps one might try to get around these problems by continuing to use the
material conditional for the restricted universal quantifier, and taking the
inferences that fail to be valid as default inferences, say, using LPm—though
one might well have reservations about this: one might expect Qa to follow
from ‘all P s are Qs’ and Pa, even if ¬Pa as well.
A more robust approach to the matter is provided by the use of the con-
sistency operator. We can use this to define a “strong” material conditional,
A A B, as †A ∨B. It is not hard to check that its truth table is as follows:
A t b f
t t b f
b t b f
f t t t
and since the ∨-∧-† fragment of the language is exactly classical propositional
logic, so is the ∨-∧-†-A fragment.52 It is also not difficult to see that when
51See, e.g, Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest, and Restall (2006).
52The whole logic is the logic LFI1 of Carnielli, Coniglio, and de Amo (2000). They
use an inconsistency operator, •, instead of a consistency operator; but these things are
interdefinable, since one is the negation (¬) of the other.
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the language is extended by quantifiers, the ∨-∧-†-A-∀-∃ fragment is classical
first-order logic.53
We now define the restricted quantifiers as follows:
All As are Bs ∀x(A A B)
Some As are Bs ∃x(A ∧B)
Some As are not Bs ∃x(A ∧ ¬B)
No As are Bs ¬∃x(A ∧B)
The only standard inferences that could break down are those concerning
‘All’. But virtually all of these are valid. For example, it is not difficult to
check the validity of the following:
• ∀x(Px A Qx), Pa ` Qa
• ∀xPx ` ∀x(Qx A Px)
• ∀x(Px A Qx), ∀x(Qx A Rx) ` ∀x(Px A Rx)
• ¬∀x(Px A Qx) ` ∃x(Px ∧ ¬Qx)
• ∃x(Px ∧ ¬Qx) ` ¬∀x(Px A Qx)
On the failure side of the ledger, A does not contrapose:
• P A Q 0 ¬Q A ¬P
(assign t to P , and b to Q). The main inferences concerning restricted quan-
tification which fail are those that require contraposition essentially, such
as:54
• ∀x(Px A Qx),¬Qa ` ¬Pa
• ∀x¬Px ` ∀x(Px A Qx)
53Again, any classical counter-model is an LP counter-model. Given an LP counter-
model, define an interpretation which is the same, except that any n-tuple of objects which
is in both the extension and anti-extension of a predicate is just in the extension. A simple
induction shows that any sentence that has the value t or b in the old model has the value
t in the new one; and any sentence that has the value f in the old model has the value f
in this one. Hence, this is a classical counter-model.
54For the second, contraposition is required to take us from ¬A |= ¬B A ¬A to ¬A |=
A A B.
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But this is entirely to be expected in a paraconsistent context, because of
the possible contradictory behaviour of P and Q.
I note, finally, that since in positive contexts, A behaves exactly as does
⊃, it is no better as a candidate for a genuine conditional than ⊃, being
subject to many of the counter-examples of 6.4.
9 Interim Conclusions
The preceding discussion has taken us through many issues. So before moving
on to set theory, let me try to draw together some of the threads. According
to Strategy 1, the T -Schema is available in the form of a material, but not a
detachable, conditional. This leaves several further options concerning truth,
a detachable conditional, and the consistency operator. We may tabulate
these as follows:
Material
T -Schema.
↙ ↘
Transparent
truth predicate.
No detachable
conditional.
(1)
Detachable
intensional
conditional.
↙ ↘
T -rules.
No consistency
operator.
(2)
Consistency
operator.
Restricted
T -rules.
(3)
Let us note the relative advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
We set aside Kripke’s paradox (4.6), to which considerations of truth are
irrelevant.
In option (1), we have a transparent truth predicate, but, on account of
this, no detachable conditional. A major benefit of this approach is that it
allows indefeasible endorsement.55 Other plusses are given by the solutions
55This is also the only option that is available if one is a deflationist about truth—as is
Beall (2008). However, I do not subscribe to such a view. See IC, 4.4.
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to the problems noted in 4.1 (Curry Paradox) and 4.2 (Validity Curry). The
downsides are that it cannot handle the problems of 4.3-4.5 (the Infinitary
Curry, Smiley’s Paradox, and the Denotation Paradox). It has no plausible
account of a genuine conditional (if detachment be part of such an account);
and it cannot accept a consistency operator with its attendant virtues.
In option (2), we have the T -rules, but not a transparent truth predicate.
This has all the plusses of approach (1). In addition, it allows a decent
account of an intentional and detachable conditional. Its downsides are that
it does not solve the problems of 4.3-4.5, and cannot accept a consistency
operator either.
In option (3), we have the solutions to all of 4.1-4.5. The option also
allows for an intensional and detachable conditional, and admits the use of
a consistency operator, with its attendant benefits—including a solution to
the problem of restricted quantification which does not depend on defeasi-
bility. On this account, blind endorsement has to be handled by the use of
propositional quantification (or maybe defeasibly).
If one takes option (3), then the present considerations put no constraints
on truth other than that it satisfy the T -Schema. This, as I have observed, is
a relatively weak constraint. Further constraints may come, not from truth
itself, but from the general principle of inconsistency-minimisation: incon-
sistencies should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The truth predicate
should be as consistent as possible. One way of understanding this is that
the models of truth should be minially inconsistent (with respect to truth),
in the sense of 6.3.
I would currently rank these three options in reverse order. (So (3) is
preferable to (2), which is preferable to (1).) But further investigations could
easily change this ranking.
10 The Comprehension Schema
Let us now turn to matters set-theoretic. I note that the theory of properties
sits midway between the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, λ-conversion
being structurally isomorphic to both the Satisfaction Schema and the Ab-
straction Schema. But it is not committed to the corresponding identity
conditions: syntactic ones in the case of satisfaction, and Extensionality in
the case of sets. Since it is less constrained that either of these notions, any-
thing that I have to say applying to either of these applies to naive property
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theory, so I will discuss it no further here.
The paradoxes of set theory are delivered by the naive Abstraction Scheme:56
• yε{x : A} ⇔ Ax(y)
It is often technically easier to deal with a language without set abstracts,
though. So let us take this in the form of the Comprehension Schema. Where
x is not free in A:57
• ∃x∀y(yεx⇔ A)
Strategy 2 is to take ⇒ to be a detachable, non-contracting, intensional
conditional. The best work on the second strategy to date is by Zach Weber.
In particular, he has shown how to obtain the standard results of the theory
of numbers (ordinal and cardinal), in this approach.58 On the question of the
extent to which one can do other important things, such as model-theory,
the jury is still out.
The strategy we are exploring here, however, is Strategy 1, where ⇔ is
≡. This strategy does not determine how to interpret the conditionals in the
other important principle of naive set theory, Extensionality:
• ∀x(xεy ⇔ xεz)⇒ y = z
The obvious candidate for the biconditional is material equivalence. After
all, sets are extensional entities par excellence. The best candidate for the
(other) conditional is not so obvious. The simplest suggestion, however, is to
take it to be the material conditional too. That way, the whole theory can
be accommodated in the language of LP .
Given these understandings, many of the comments concerning the T -
Scheme in the second part of this essay carry over to the Comprehension
Schema in a very simple way. The theory is inconsistent. Just take A to be
¬xεx. Call the resulting set r, and instantiate x with r, to get rεr ≡ ¬rεr.
(In what follows, I will often ignore the use/mention distinction harmlessly,
in the cause of readability, using a set as its own name.) But it is non-trivial.
56Well, the universal closure of this. In what follows, A will always be allowed to contain
arbitrary parameters.
57There is also the General Comprehension Schema, where this constraint is dropped,
which—perhaps surprisingly—makes very little difference to matters of triviality. See
Brady (1989).
58Weber (2010), (2012).
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Take an interpretation with a domain, D = {a, b}, where a and b are distinct.
Let the extension and anti-extension of ε be D2, and the interpretation of =
be standard. It is a simple matter to show that this interpretation verifies
both the Comprehension Schema and Extensionality. (The antecedent of Ex-
ensionality is both true and false.) Because = is classical, the interpretation
is non-trivial. Of course, there are more interesting interpretations, as we
shall see in due course.
If the language also contains a detachable conditional, →, we can formu-
late the Curry Paradox by taking A to be xεx→ ⊥. Call the resulting set c,
and instantiate x with c to get a sentence of the form cεc ≡ (cεc→ ⊥). The
Curry triviality argument does not go through, due to the non-detachability
of the material conditional. Indeed, non-triviality can be proved when the
language contains a consistency operator, ◦ and/or a detachable and con-
tracting intensional→. The argument in the first case is exactly the same as
without it. In the second case, simply consider a (constant domain) Rout-
ley/Meyer interpretation for the logic R—so where→ is detachable and con-
tracting—and where the base world is of the kind described in the previous
paragraph.59
Adding set abstracts to the language offers some new options. First,
given just the language of LP , the Abstraction Scheme, yε{x : A} ≡ Ax(y)
is not trivial. An easy way to see this is to take the two-element model of
the Comprehension Schema defined above, extend it to one of the -calculus,
as in 4.5, and define {x : A} as x∀y(y ∈ x ≡ A). It is easy to see that
the model verifies the Abstraction Schema, even when -terms are allowed to
occur in A.
The analogy with truth suggests that we might need something stronger,
though, namely the Abstraction Inference:
Ax(y)
yε{x : A}
(and maybe its contraposed form too). This delivers the material Compre-
hension Schema. These rules can be shown to be non-trivial by a fixed-point
construction.60 The construction does not validate Extensionality, however.
59One may naturally ask what the mi consequences of Comprehension and Extension-
ality are. The answer to this is presently unknown, since we have no knowledge of what
the mi models are.
60See Priest (2002a), 8.5.
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I take it that the two together probably are non-trivial. But it is not clear
what their models are.61
If there is a consistency operator, however, the Abstraction inference does
deliver triviality. Where †A is ¬A∧◦A, take a to be {x : †xεx}. We then get
aεa a` †aεa, and triviality follows, as in the case for truth. Moreover, also as
in the case for truth, if we have a detachable intentional arrow validating A↔
A, and abstracts are “transparent”, in the sense that Ax(y) is everywhere
intersubstitutable with yε{x : A}, then we have Abstraction in a detachable
form, yε{x : A} ↔ Ax(y), and Strategy 1 collapses into Strategy 2.
11 Regaining Set Theory
The situation concerning the theory of sets is importantly different from
the theory of truth and other semantic notions, however. In the case of set
theory, but not semantics, and even before the advent of Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, there was a substantial development of informal set-theory, to
which any regimentation must answer. Any formalisation which could not
account for the central parts of this would not get very far. So a pressing
question for Strategy 1, when it comes to set theory, is whether it can do
this, and if so, how.
As an axiomatic theory, Extensionality and Comprehension would seem
to be quite inadequate in this regard. The non-detachability of the material
conditional would seem to render it entirely incapable of reasoning in any-
thing like the normal way. The presence of a detachable conditional in the
language does not seem to help much either: it does nothing to overcome the
fact that one cannot detach in the cases of the central set-theoretic principles.
Adding set-abstracts and especially the Abstraction inference may do
something to help—though given the non-detachability of Extensionality,
perhaps not enough. At any rate, without an understanding of the models
of this theory, it is hard to say anything very substantial about the matter.62
It might be thought that adding a classicality operator would help: given
that certain sentences may be taken to be consistent, and stated to be so, a
number of standard results of set-theory might be forthcoming. Thus, one
could postulate that the sets in the cumulative hierarchy behave consistently.
61And a fortiori, what their mi models are.
62The same is true of using LPm as an inference engine: without an understanding of
the mi models, nothing of much substance can be said.
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The problem, though, is to prove that they exist in the first place. Another
thought is to take the axioms of ZF to be consistent, so that we can deduce
classically therefrom. The problem here is that, once inconsistent sets are
part of the picture, there is no reason to believe that the axioms of ZF are
consistently true.
Indeed, they are not. Zermelo’s Separation Principle (Aussonderungsax-
iom)—a restricted version of the Comprehension Schema—says that:
• ∀z∃y∀x(xεy ≡ xεz ∧ A)
where y is not free in A. Now, where r is the Russell set, we have as an
instance:
• ∀z∃y∀x(xεy ≡ xεz ∧ rεr)
Suppose that this has the value t. Then any instantiation of the initial
universal quantifier also has the value t. Choose any i and j such that it is
true that iεj. Then the following is t:
• ∃y∀x(xεy ≡ xεj ∧ rεr)
So there must be some witness of y which makes it t. Choose one such, k.
Then the following is t:
• ∀x(xεk ≡ xεj ∧ rεr)
Again, every instantiation of the universal quantifier is t, so
• iεk ≡ iεj ∧ rεr
is t. Now, the right hand side of this is true, since both conjuncts are, and
also false, since ¬rεr is true. Hence, whatever value iεk has, the biconditional
has the value b, contrary to assumption.
11.1 Type Lifting
11.1.1 With a Partition
In virtue of these facts, another strategy recommends itself—a model theo-
retic strategy.63 If there are interpretations of naive set theory that verify
63This is outlined in IC, 18.4.
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all the theorems of ZF (including the Axiom of Choice—this will go without
saying in what follows), we may take the universe (or universes, if there are
more than one64) of sets to be like that. Since anything proved classically
in ZF is true in such universes, anything which can be established in ZF
would then be perfectly acceptable in dialetheic set theory. That includes,
of course, most of standard set-theory, though the truth would go beyond
this—for example, in allowing the existence of proper-class sized totalities,
which are not legitimate in ZF .
But are there such interpretations? There are. In what follows, we will
look at some techniques for constructing them, starting in this section, with
type-lifting. I note that our target theory will, of course, have many models,
and some of them will clearly be pathological (such as the one-element in-
terpretation where everything is true). That a theory can have pathological
models is not, of course, news; but there is always the important question of
which models are pathological and which are not. That is not a question I
will address here, though. For the present, it suffices to show that there are
models of the appropriate kind.
Let M = 〈D, δ〉 be any LP interpretation,65 and let pi be any partition
of D. That is, pi is a set of non-empty subsets of D, such that every member
of D is in exactly one member of pi. If d ∈ D, let [d] be the set of which it
is a member. We define a new interpretation, Mpi = 〈Dpi, δpi〉, the collapsed
interpretation, as follows. c is any constant in the language of M, and Pn is
any n-place predicate:
• Dpi = pi = {[d] : d ∈ D}
• δpi(c) = [δ(c)]
• 〈e1, ..., en〉 ∈ δ+pi (Pn) iff ∃d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en 〈d1, ..., dn〉 ∈ δ+(Pn)
• 〈e1, ..., en〉 ∈ δ−pi (Pn) iff ∃d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en 〈d1, ..., dn〉 ∈ δ−(Pn)
The collapsed model effectively identifies all the members of any set in the
partition, so that the set behaves effectively like a “superposition” of it mem-
bers in the collapsed model.
Mpi is an LP interpretation. Checking the relevant conditions: For
any e1, ..., en ∈ Dpi, there are d1, ...dn ∈ D such that d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en.
64The idea of a plurality of universes is defended by Hamkins in (2012) and elsewhere.
65I am assuming, as in 2.1, that there are no function symbols in the language.
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Since 〈d1, ..., dn〉 ∈ δ+(Pn) or 〈d1, ..., dn〉 ∈ δ−(Pn), 〈e1, ..., en〉 ∈ δ+pi (Pn) or
〈e1, ..., en〉 ∈ δ−pi (Pn). And:
〈e1, e2〉 ∈ δ+pi (=) iff ∃d1 ∈ e1, d2 ∈ e2 〈d1, d2〉 ∈ δ+(=)
iff ∃d1 ∈ e1, d2 ∈ e2 d1 = d2
iff e1 = e2
The last line holds because pi is a partition.
We can now prove the Collapsing Lemma. I formulate this in a slightly
more complex way than necessary because of what is to come. For simplicity
of notation, I will use members of the domain as their own names. (Effec-
tively, then, each d ∈ D, when construed as a name, plays the role of the
canonical constant kd of 2.1.) A(d1, ...dn) will mean that the constants in A
occur amongst d1, ...dn.
For any formula in the language of M:
• If M + A(d1, ...dn) and d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en, then Mpi + A(e1, ..., en)
• If M − A(d1, ...dn) and d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en, then Mpi − A(e1, ..., en)
The proof is by a simple joint induction on the structure of A. Here are
the + cases for atoms, conjunction, negation, the particular and universal
quantifiers. The other cases are similar. We suppose that d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en.
M + Pd1...dn ⇒ 〈d1, ..., d1〉 ∈ δ+(P )
⇒ 〈e1, ..., en〉 ∈ δ+pi (P )
⇒ Mpi + Pe1...en
M + ¬A(d1, ..., dn) ⇒ M − A(d1, ..., dn)
⇒ Mpi − A(e1, ..., en) IH
⇒ Mpi + ¬A(e1, ..., en)
M + (A ∧B)(d1, ..., dn) ⇒ M + A(d1, ..., dn) and M + B(d1, ..., dn)
⇒ Mpi + A(e1, ..., en) and Mpi + B(e1, ..., en) IH
⇒ Mpi + (A ∧B)(e1, ..., en)
M + ∃xA(d1, ..., dn) ⇒ ∃d ∈ D,M + Ax(d)(d1, ..., dn)
⇒ ∃e ∈ Dpi,Mpi + Ax(e)(e1, ..., en) IH
⇒ Mpi + ∃xA(e1, ..., en)
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The second line holds because every d is a member of some e.
M + ∀xA(d1, ..., dn) ⇒ ∀d ∈ D,M + Ax(d)(d1, ..., dn)
⇒ ∀e ∈ Dpi,Mpi + Ax(e)(e, ..., en) IH
⇒ Mpi + ∃xA(e1, ..., en)
The second line holds because every e contains some d.
Now, fix the language to be that of ZF (with Foundation).66 Let M=
〈D, δ〉 be a model of ZF (a classical model if you like, but it can be any LP
interpretation); let α be some ordinal in M, and let i be the object which is
Vα in M (the sets of rank < α). Let pi be the partition of D which puts every
member of rank < α (in M) in its own singleton, and puts all the others
(including i) into a single set, a.
Construct the collapsed interpretation, Mpi. By the Collapsing Lemma,
it is a model of ZF , and since Extensionality is an axiom of ZF , it is a model
of that, but it is also a model of Comprehension.
To see the last of these, take any e in Dpi, and let d ∈ e. Then eεa is true
in Mpi. For if d is of rank < α, it is true in M that dεi, so the result follows
by the Collapsing Lemma. But if it is of rank ≥ α, then in M it is a member
of, say, its singleton, which is of rank ≥ α and so in a. So again, the result
follows. But eεa is also false in the collapsed model. For if d is of rank ≥ α,
dεi is false in M, and so the result follows by the Collapsing Lemma. But if
in M it is of rank < α it is not a member of, say, the singleton of i, which
is in a, so the result again follows. Thus, in the collapsed model, eεa!, and
so for any A, eεa ≡ A is true. And since this is true for all e in Dpi, so is
∀x(xεa ≡ A), and ∃y∀x(xεy ≡ A).
Clearly, the collapsed model just constructed is not a very interesting one.
The much overworked a is the witness set for every condition. But it suffices
to establish that there are interpretations of both ZF and naive set theory.
In what follows, we will see how to construct more discriminating models.
11.1.2 With a Covering
One way to do so is to use what I will call the Hamkins type-lift.67 This is
exactly the same as the previous type-lift, except that we take as pi, not a
partition, but an arbitrary covering. That is, pi is now a family of non-empty
66What follows is taken from IC, 18.4.
67Since it was suggested by Joel Hamkins in discussion.
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subsets of D such that every member of d is in at least one such set. (It may
be in more.)
If one does this, then two features of the partition type-lift fail. The first
is that in the collapsed model the denotation of ‘=’ may not be the identity
relation. However, as far as constructing models of set theory goes, we can
ignore this, since we do not need to assume that the language contains the
identity predicate. We can just define x = y as ∀z(zεx ≡ zεy) ∧ ∀z(xεz ≡
yεz). In ZF this delivers the substitutivity of identicals. In naive set theory,
as we are understanding it here, it does not. (For example, transitivity fails.)
So identity will behave in an unusual way in such a theory. But since the
name of the game at this point is recapturing the theorems of ZF , this does
not matter. So let us assume that we are dealing with a set theory in which
identity is defined.
The second difference is that the denotation function for constants is no
longer well-defined, since the sets of a partition may overlap. As far as set
theory goes, this does not matter either, since the language of ZF has no
constant symbols. However, as set up, constants were used in giving the
truth/falsity conditions of quantifiers. This is no longer possible: we have,
instead, to deploy open sentences and talk of truth under assignations of the
free variables. To preserve as much of the notation as possible, let us write
A(x1, ..., xn) to mean that the variables of A occur amongst x1, ..., xn. And if
M = 〈D, δ〉 is any interpretation, and d1, ...dn are any members of D, we will
write M ± A(d1, ..., dn) to mean that A is true/false in M when x1, ..., xn
are assigned d1,..., dn, respectively. (The practice of using members of the
domain as their own names smooths this transition.)
With these understandings, the rest of the construction (including the
Collapsing Lemma) goes through, as may easily be checked.
Now take any model of ZF , and let pi be any covering of the domain.
We have a model of ZF by the Collapsing Lemma. But there is a large
difference between the covering construction and the partition construction.
If the original model has cardinality κ, the partition construction produces a
model of cardinality less than or equal to κ, whereas the covering construction
produces a model of cardinality less than or equal to 2κ—a potentially much
richer model.
Let us take M to be a classical model, and look at the richest of these,
where pi contains all the non-empty subsets of D. If d ∈ D, then Mpi will
contain an element {d}, and this will behave exactly as does d in M. But
now Mpi will contain things answering to proper classes in M too.
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In particular, let A(x, x1, ..., xn) be any formula in the language of M.
Take e1, ..., en ∈ Dpi, and let d1 ∈ e1, ..., dn ∈ en. Let:
• Γ = {d ∈ D : M + A(d, d1, ..., dn)}
Suppose that Γ = ∅. Take any e ∈ Dpi and some d ∈ e. Then it is not the
case that M + A(d, d1, ..., dn), so M + ¬A(d, d1, ..., dn). Hence, Mpi +
¬A(e, e1, ..., en). Now let i be the object which is the empty set in M. Then
M + ¬dεi. Let a be any member of Dpi such that i ∈ a. Then Mpi + ¬eεa.
Thus, for any e ∈ Dpi, Mpi + eεa ≡ A(e, e1, ..., en), and so Mpi + ∀x(x ∈
a ≡ A(x, e1, ..., en)).
Suppose, on the other hand, that Γ 6= ∅. If d ∈ D, let ds be its singleton
in M, and let a ∈ Dpi, where:
• a = {ds : d ∈ Γ}
Take any e ∈ Dpi, and some d ∈ e. Now, either d ∈ Γ or d /∈ Γ.
If the first, then M + A(d, d1, ..., dn), so Mpi + A(e, e1, ..., en). But
since 〈d, ds〉 ∈ δ+(ε), 〈e, a〉 ∈ δ+pi (ε). That is, Mpi + eεa. Hence, Mpi +
eεa ≡ A(e, e1, ..., en).
If the second, it is not the case that M + A(d, d1, ..., dn), so M +
¬A(d, d1, ..., dn), and Mpi + ¬A(e, e1, ..., en). But if g ∈ a, 〈d, g〉 ∈ δ−(ε)
(since g is a singleton of something in Γ—this is where the classicality of M
is used). So 〈e, a〉 ∈ δ−pi (ε). That is, Mpi + ¬eεa. Hence, Mpi + eεa ≡
A(e, e1, ..., en).
So in either case Mpi + ∀x(xεa ≡ A(x, e1, ..., en)).
Thus, in all cases, there is a ∈ Dpi such thatMpi + ∀x(xεa ≡ A(e, e1, ..., en))
and so Mpi + ∃y∀x(xεy ≡ A(y, e1, ..., en).
Of course pi is much larger than necessary to make this construction go
through. The constraints on Dpi needed to make the construction work are
pretty minimal. But in any case, applying the construction delivers different
as to witness different instances of the Comprehension Schema, making the
model much more discriminating than that of 11.1.
11.2 Expansions
11.2.1 The Basic Construction
In this section, we will look at another construction which can be used to
produce models of ZF and naive set theory. We may call these ‘Expansions’.
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Let M = 〈D,µ〉 be any model of ZF (again, not necessarily a classical
model, but it can be). We now define another interpretation, N = 〈D, ν〉,
obtained from M by enlarging the extension/anti-extension of ε. (It leaves
the extension and anti-extension of =, if it is in the language, alone.) By
the Monotonicity Lemma, any such extension is also a model of ZF (and so,
Extensionality).
Let A be any formula in the language of this interpretation with at most
one free variable, x. The cardinality of the set of such formulas is the same
as the cardinality of M. So for each such A, select a distinct object, aA ∈ D.
(Again, I will use members of the domain autonomously for ease of reading.)68
ν is defined as follows:
• ν+(ε) = µ+(ε) ∪ {〈b, aA〉 : b ∈ D,M + Ax(b)}
• ν−(ε) = µ−(ε) ∪ {〈b, aA〉 : b ∈ D,M + ¬Ax(b)}
For future reference, let the extension and anti-extension of ε in N be E+
and E−, respectively.
We can now show that:
• N + ∀x(xεaA ≡ A)
Let b be any member of D. Then M + Ax(b) or M + ¬Ax(b). In the first
case, N + Ax(b), by Montonicity, and N + bεaA, by construction. Hence
N + bεaA ≡ Ax(b). In the second case, N + ¬Ax(b), by Monotonicity, and
N + ¬bεaA, by construction. Hence N + bεaA ≡ Ax(b), N + ∀x(xεaA ≡
A), and N + ∃y∀x(xεy ≡ A).
In this construction, distinct sets witness different conditions in the com-
prehension scheme. But there is obviously an element of arbitrariness in the
choice of these. This can be reduced in the following way.69
We define N as above, but we now make the choice of aA depend on an
ordinal, α (in M), generating a family of interpretations, Nα. At level α, aA
is chosen as follows. If A defines a set, c, in M (so that the things that satisfy
A are exactly the members of c), take aA to be c. Then the membership and
non-membership of c will be the same in M and Nα. If A does not define a
68In classical models, the construction can be varied by identifying co-extensive (in M)
sets. Specifically, define A1 ∼ A2 to mean that M + ∀x(A1 ≡ A2). ∼ is clearly an
equivalence relation, and if [A] is any equivalence class, we select a distinct object, a[A].
69The suggestions is, again, due to Joel Hamkins.
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set, it is satisfied by things of arbitrarily high rank. However, it has a set-
sized “approximation” at α, namely, the things that satisfy it which occur at
that level. Let aA be the set in M defined by the condition A∧xεVα. Then in
Nα the things which are members of aA will be exactly those things satisfying
A. The things which are not members of aA will be all the members of Vα
that satisfy ¬A, plus all the things of rank > α.
If A defines a set in M, the denotation of aA is stable and constant as
α increases. But if not, as α increases, aA may change its denotation. Its
extension remains stable, but its anti-extension shrinks. So aA increasingly
approximates the proper class defined by A. One might take there to be
multiple universes of set theory, as given by the Nαs.
Of the ways we have looked at for constructing models of ZF and naive set
theory, the Hamkins type-lift produces perhaps the most natural candidate
for a model of the universe of sets. The other constructions deliver a model
of the cumulative hierarchy (as defined in ZF ) with inconsistent sets inside
it. The Hamkins construction delivers a consistent model of the cumulative
hierarchy with extra inconsistent sets.70
11.2.2 Variations
The Expansion construction can be used to show not only how dialetheic set
theory can capture the power of ZF , but how it can go beyond it. In this
subsection, we will see how.
First, it can be used to show that there are models which contain a “stan-
dard interpretation”; that is, one satisfying the model-theoretic T -Schema
(which is not, of course, possible classically). To see this, we can apply the
construction to any model M (classical or non-classical) of ZF as before,
but with a small addition. There are many sets, a, such that M +[a is an
LP interpretation]. (I insert square brackets here and in what follows for
readability.) Choose one which is distinct from all the aAs. (We can always
arrange for it not to have been used before.) Maybe a natural candidate here
for what follows is the section of the cumulative hierarchy, Vϑ, where ϑ is
some inaccessible ordinal. The relation of being true in that interpretation
will be a perfectly good set (in M), +a . Its members are ordered pairs, the
first of which is a, and the second of which is the code of a sentence. (I write
the code of A as #A.) Let pA be the set in M which is the ordered pair of a
70As in the picture suggested in IC, ch. 2 and 19.2.
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and #A. Then the extension and anti-extension of ε in N are:
• E+ ∪ {〈pA,+a 〉 : M + A}
• E− ∪ {〈pA,+a 〉 : M + ¬A}
By the Monotonicity Lemma, N +[a is an LP interpretation]. But also:
• N + [A ≡ a + A]
For either M + A or M + ¬A. In the first case, N + A, by Monotonicity,
and N + [a + A], by construction. Hence N + [A ≡ a + A]. In
the second case, N + ¬A, by Monotonicity, and N + [¬(a + A)], by
construction. Hence N + [A ≡ a + A]. So:
• N + [a is an LP interpretation ∧(A ≡ a + A)]
In other words, in N, a is a standard interpratation.
Extending can be used to produce models of many other interesting
claims. There is a lot to be said for the thought that the universe of sets
is countable. In the present context, this does not rule out the possibility
that it is uncountable too. Indeed, given the close conceptual connection
between Cantor’s theorem and Russell’s paradox, the thought that this is a
paradoxical situation is a very natural one.71
Now, take M to be a countable model of ZF in which ω is the standard
natural numbers. Let θ enumerate the domain of M. Choose any f in the
domain of M (distinct from all the aAs) such that:
• M + [f is a function with domain ω]
Let tn be the set in M which is the ordered pair whose first member is n,
and whose second member is θ(n). The extension and anti-extension of ε in
N are, respectively:
• E+ ∪ {〈tn, f〉 : n ∈ ω}
• E−
Now, by Monotonicity:
• N +[f is a function with domain ω]
71See Priest (2012).
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Also, by Monotonicity, tn is an ordered pair of n and θ(n) in N. Hence, for
any n:
• N + 〈n, θ(n)〉 εf
So:
• N + ∀y∃x 〈x, y〉 εf
and N + [There is a function which enumerates all sets]
Proof-theoretically, the weakness of LP is a negative feature. Model-
theoretically, it is a positive feature, since it provides great scope for the
construction of interesting models.
A final comment. One may ask in what set theory the above proofs
are being conducted. The answer is: in ZF . One might take this to be
infelicitous if the correct set theory is naive set theory. But it is not: we have
just seen how naive set theory can simply appropriate any theorem of ZF .
11.3 Meadows’ Objections
I pause here to consider some recent objections by Meadows,72 who challenges
the coherence of the strategy for regaining the riches of informal set theory,
which we have been investigating in previous sections. He has two main
arguments against it.
In the first (Section 2) he notes that the model-theoretic constructions
provided deliver no reason to suppose that they are decent models of the
universe of sets. This is correct. But neither were they meant to. My aim
was not to give an argument for the models provided, but merely to show
that there are structures of the kind in question. It is a proof of concept.
All I claim is that we may suppose that the universe (or universes) of sets
verifies the Comprehension Schema and the theorems of ZF .73 Recall that
72Meadows (2015). Page and section references in what follows are to this. Meadows
targets just the model of 11.1.1, but his considerations apply equally to all the models
constructed in the above sections.
73In particular, I am not at all attempting to provide ‘a compelling illustration of what
the universe of sets out to be like’ (Claim 11, p. 186). Indeed, Meadows quotes me as
saying (p. 183) ‘We may therefore suppose that the true interpretation of the language of
set theory has these properties’ (my italics). And as he himself says ‘our goal was to be
able to take up the classical perspective of set theory in a fashion that is acceptable for
the paraconsistent set theorist’. Acceptable, not mandated.
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 4
108
the point was to show how the Naive Theory of Sets (NST ) can make sense
of standard results in set theory. It can do so if we suppose that the universe
of sets is of the kind the models deliver, since they are models of ZF . Why
should one suppose that the universe of sets is a model of ZF? Because
doing so allows us to give an account of the Cantorian picture of sets. Unless
set theory is to be unacceptably revisionist, any account must do this. Why
does Meadows accept ZF? Precisely because it does a pretty good job of
this. I do it for the same reason.
His second argument is in Section 4.74 I am showing how someone who
accepts NST can make use of the results of ZF . I use a construction in
ZF to do this. This is obviously a bootstrapping construction. (Logic is
full of such things. Consider, for example, how the argument for the model-
theoretic soundness of a form of inference typically uses that very form of
inference.) Meadows urges that it is viciously circular. I have to presuppose
the adequacy of ZF in order to show that ZF is acceptable. Now, if I were
trying to justify the reasoning of ZF , this would indeed be vicious. But
as I have already explained, my aim here is not to justify anything: I am
proposing a mathematical hypothesis which makes sense of certain facts by
its own lights. In a similar way, from a classical perspective, within ZF
one can construct the cumulative hierarchy, and one can then show that the
structure verifies the axioms of ZF . If this were a justificatory activity, it
would obviously be vicious. But that is not the point. It is simply a piece
of boot-strapping showing a mathematical structure to be legitimate by its
own lights.
In sum, then, Meadows’ criticisms get off on the wrong foot right at the
start. He assumes that what I am after is a justification for using ZF . I am
not. I am assuming that we need an account which delivers Cantorian set
theory. ZF does this, more or less, and I am explaining how ZF may be
seen of as justified from a paraconsistent perspective.
74In Section 3 of his paper he considers what he takes to be an alternative strategy for
achieving the goals at issue. This would be to solve Problem 5: If there is a nontrivial LP
model of NST , then there is a classical model of ZF . I have no brief for this strategy. I
expect any model of set theory that is anything like the universe of sets to be inconsistent.
The remarks in this section are therefore beside the point.
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12 Metatheory
12.1 Model Theoretic Validity
A discussion of set theory naturally takes us into one of metatheory, and
specifically of model theory, since this is formulated in terms of sets.
Classical logicians normally take model-theoretic constructions—for both
classical and non-classical logics—to be undertaken in ZF . What we have
just seen is that, on the model-theoretic strategy, working within ZF pro-
duces perfectly acceptable dialetheic results. In particular, working within
ZF , we can define the notion of an interpretation, truth/falsity in an inter-
pretation, and validity, for the logic LP . In particular, Σ  A is defined in
the usual way as:75
• ∀M(M + Σ ⊃M + A)
On this account, the connection between the truth-in-an-interpretation (tii)
of the premises and the tii of the conclusion is a material one. Hence, one
can move from the tii of the premises of a valid argument to the tii of the
conclusion only defeasibly. And given that there is a standard interpretation,
where truth in an interpretation is truth simpliciter, the same goes for truth.
Assuming that such inference is governed by something like LPm, this means
that we can move from the premises to the conclusion if, but only if, the
antecedent is consistent. In particular, if Σ = {B}, we cannot move from
M + B to M + A if it is also not the case that M + B, as well—which
is, of course, quite different from its being the case that M + ¬B.
What is the significance of this?
12.2 Defeasible Deductive Inference
This depends on how one understands the significance of model theory. A
straightforward way to understand the model-theoretic definition of validity
is as specifying the meaning of ‘valid’. In this case, even valid deductive
inferences are, in the last instance, default inferences!
It might be thought odd to have the validity of a deductive inference
grounded in a defeasible inference such as the disjunctive syllogism.76 But
75This is a relationship between a set of formulas and a formula. So strictly speaking,
it should be written as Σ  〈A〉, but I omit the quotation marks, as logicians usually do.
76The following paragraphs comes from IC, 18.5.
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a little thought may assuage this worry. The difference between a material
M + Σ ⊃ M + A and a detachable M + Σ → M + A is not as great
as might be thought. Both are simply true (or false) statements. Inference,
by contrast, is an action. Given the premises of an argument, an inference
is a jump to a new state. No number of truths is the same thing as a jump.
(This is the moral of Lewis Carroll’s celebrated dialogue between Achilles
and the Tortoise.77) None the less, truths of a certain kind may ground the
jump, in the sense of making it a reasonable action. There is no reason why
a sentence of the form A ⊃ B may not do this, just as much as one of the
form A→ B. It is just that one of the latter kind always does so, while one
of the former kind does so only sometimes (normally).
If it is not clear how a defeasible warrant for an action can work, merely
consider sentences of the form:
(*) You promised to do x
The truth of (*) is normally a ground for doing x, in the sense of making
it reasonable to do so. But, to use a celebrated example, suppose that (*)
is true, where the x in question is the returning of a weapon to a certain
person. And suppose that the person comes requesting the weapon, but you
know that they intend to use it to commit murder. Then the truth of (*)
does not, in this context, ground the action. Just as with validity and the
material conditional: the truth of a sentence of a certain kind may ground
an appropriate action in normal circumstances, but fail to do so in unusual
circumstances.
This approach, it seems to me, is perfectly viable, but it certainly ratchets
up the considerations about fallibility of 6.4, another notch.
12.3 Extensional Equivalence
Another, perhaps less radical, possibility is to take the model-theoretic ac-
count as providing, not a definition of validity, but merely an extensionally
equivalent characterisation. The meaning of ‘valid’ itself can be characterised
in a different way, say proof-theoretically, or simply taken as an indefinable
primitive. The model-theoretic account merely gives us a characterisation
of what inferences are and are not deductively valid, nothing more. Valid
inferences can then simply license detachment of their conclusions, though
77Carroll (1895).
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this aspect of things may not be captured by the characterisation. In a sim-
ilar way, an inferentialist who takes validity to be defined in terms of the
meanings of the logical constants, spelled out in terms of introduction and
elimination rules, may yet hold that a model-theoretic definition of validity
delivers an extensionally equivalent characterisation (if sound and complete),
but that it captures nothing of the semantic features of genuine validity.
One way to develop this idea is to use the entailment connective, , of
4.2. As we noted there, the naive V -Schema is: V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ≡ A  B.
And now we may just think of V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) as ∀M(M + A ⊃M + B).
The material biconditional spells out the extensional equivalence between the
set theoretic characterisation and entailment itself, in good paraconsistent
fashion. Defeasibility is still present, of course, but it now resides in both
directions of the move between a model-theoretic statement of validity and
entailment itself.
13 In Contradiction Revisited
Let me finish the whole discussion by reviewing the places in IC where
detachability for the biconditionals of the naive principles plays an important
role. There are four such places.
(1) In Section 1.8, there is a proof of Berry’s paradox. This does not
use the LEM . Indeed, the point of the section was exactly to show that
rejecting the LEM does not solve all the paradoxes of self-reference. It does
use detachment for the D-Scheme, however. So if this is not valid, the proof
breaks down (though the argument still delivers a contradiction, as noted in
fn. 10). In the present context, this is unimportant, however, since, as we
saw in 3.1, the Liar paradox itself does not require the LEM .
(2) Section 3.5 gives a proof that the Go¨del sentence, G, which states its
own unprovability with respect to our naive notion of proof, is true, T 〈G〉.
Now without the detachability of the the T -Schema, or the T -rules, we cannot
infer G—or at best, we can infer it only by default.
In fact, there are issues even before one reaches this point.78 The argu-
ment for T 〈G〉 requires a proof of the statement of soundness, in the form
Prov 〈A〉 ⇒ T 〈A〉.79 Now, if one of the rules of proof in operation is modus
78As noted by Field (2008), ch. 26.
79Or more generally, that ∀x(Prov(x)⇒ Tx), but only the schematic version is needed.
I omit the brackets after ‘Prov’ when no confusion can arise, in the cause of perspicuity.
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ponens, the soundness argument requires us to invoke (T 〈A〉∧T (〈A⇒ B〉)⇒
T 〈B〉. Given a transparent truth predicate, we have (A ∧ (A ⇒ B)) ⇒ B.
And if ⇒ detaches we are back with Curry’s paradox. (See 4.2.) Strategy 1
puts this point in a new light. First, given the T -Schema as merely a material
biconditional, (A∧ (A⇒ B))⇒ B does not follow. Secondly, even if it does,
given the T -rules, if ⇒ is ⊃, Curry’s paradox is avoided anyway. Of course,
the fact that ⊃ does not detach will certainly throw other spanners into the
works.
All of these issues can be finessed, however.80 The Go¨del sentence is
a sentence, G, of the form ¬Prov 〈G〉. Now the following are apparently
analytic Schemas about naive provability:
(1) If ` A then ` Prov 〈A〉
(2) ` Prov 〈A〉 ⊃ A
Given these, we may establishG very simply. An instance of (2) is ¬Prov 〈G〉∨
G. That is, ¬Prov 〈G〉∨¬Prov 〈G〉, that is, ¬Prov 〈G〉, that is, G. For good
measure, since we have proved G, (1) gives us Prov 〈G〉, that is ¬G.
It is also worth noting that if we have the other half of the fact that Prov
represents provability:
(3) If 0 A then ` ¬Prov 〈A〉
then we can prove (2). For either ` A or 0 A. In the first case, ` Prov 〈A〉 ⊃
A, and in the second ` ¬Prov 〈A〉 by (3), and so ` Prov 〈A〉 ⊃ A. The
proof of G therefore depends on nothing more than that Prov really does
represent provability.
I note, finally, that if one does have a proof of soundness in the form of
the Schema Prov 〈A〉 ⊃ A, then, given Prov 〈A〉, one can infer A at best by
default. (Of course, for most systems of proof, there is no reason to suppose
that provability is dialetheic; but the naive notion of proof certainly is, as we
have just seen.) Moreover, if one has a statement of soundness in the form
Prov 〈A〉 ⊃ T 〈A〉,81 or more generally, ∀x(Prov(x) ⇒ Tx), one needs one
default inference to get to T 〈A〉, and—without the T -inference—another to
get to A. Of course, using propositional quantification gives us a way around
these issues too, as we have already, in effect, noted. Soundness can be
80As pointed out in IC, 17.5.
81Which should not be confused with Prov 〈A〉 ⊃M  A, for some interpretation, M.
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expressed by ∀x∀p((Prov(x) ∧ S(x, p)) ⇒ p), where S(x, p) can be read as
‘x says that p’. A can then be inferred from Prov 〈A〉 and S(〈A〉 , A).
(3) Section 4.2 uses the practice of endorsement as an argument for the
T -Schema. This presupposes the correctness of the T -Scheme in a detachable
form.
Suppose that we continue to use the truth predicate as a way of endors-
ing. Then, as we noted, the T -inferences (which deliver the T -Scheme in
detachable form) would serve the purpose of endorsement just as well. So we
might equally see the practice as an argument for these. However, if these
rules are invalid, according to Strategy 1 endorsement works only as a default
inference. We can still hold that the practice presupposes these inferences.
It is just that the inferences actually work only defeasibly. This does not un-
dercut the argument. We have a practice of believing what people sincerely
assert. This presupposes that people do say what they take to be so; and
this is generally so—though not, of course, invariably. It remains the case
that the practice presupposes this fallible assumption about people. In the
same way, the practice of endorsement using the truth predicate presupposes
this fallible assumption of the detachability of the T -Schema. It remains the
case that the practice can misfire sometimes, as can the practice of believing
what one is told.
Alternatively, if we use propositional quantification for the purpose of
endorsement, the phenomenon becomes irrelevant to the defence of the T -
Schema. However, the plausibility of the Schema hardly rests on this argu-
ment.
(4) In Chapter 9, it is shown how to construct a semantically closed
theory of truth for a language, and prove the T -Schema recursively. The
proof given is formalised with a detachable → in the semantic principles.
However, the proof actually relies on very minimal logical resources. Crucial
are the substitutivity of identicals, and the substitutitivity of whatever sort
of equivalents the left and right side of instances of the T -Scheme (actually,
the S-Schema) have. Strategy 1 does nothing to affect the former, and the
latter holds for material equivalents, as we noted in 2.3. The construction,
then, still goes through.82
82Chapter 9 discusses the use of a theory of truth as a theory of meaning (as does 4.3).
Note that, for such a use, the instance of the T -Scheme for A delivered by the canonical
proof procedure can still be taken as giving the meaning of A, even though it has a material
biconditional. As in standard Davidsonian meaning-theory, it is not simply the truth of a
biconditional of the form T 〈A〉 ≡ B which tells you that B gives the meaning of A. It is
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14 And to Conclude...
Which of Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 do I think a better approach to the
paradoxes of self-reference? When it comes to set theory, I definitely think
that Strategy 1 is better: on present evidence, the prospects for retaining
most of standard set-theoretic reasoning in any other way seem remote. The
case is less clear with respect to the semantic paradoxes.83 Each strategy has
things it handles very naturally, and things that require careful handling. At
present, I see no decisive reasons to go either way.
Is the fact that there are multiple options for formulating a dialetheic
picture with respect to the paradoxes of self-reference a problem? On the
contrary. It provides us with great flexibility for articulating the core idea of
a dialetheic approach to the paradoxes of self-reference in the light of future
developments.84
15 Appendix: Curry’s Paradox
In this appendix I take up the question, flagged in 4.1, of whether Curry’s
paradox is of a piece with the Liar paradox. The most sustained argument
to the effect that the two are of the same kind has recently been mounted by
Beall.85 His main concern there is to argue against a dialetheic solution to
the sorites paradox; but in the process, he argues that the Curry paradox,
or at last some instances of it, are inclosure paradoxes, and so of a kind with
the Liar. In what follows, I will discuss these arguments. Let us start with
some background considerations.
the fact that it is obtained in a certain way.
83If it turns out that Strategy 2 is the appropriate strategy here, does this imply that
the two kinds of paradoxes are of different kinds? Not at all, since they are all inclosure
paradoxes. See Priest (2002b), Part 3.
84I have given talks based on drafts of parts of this paper at various places in the last
few years. I am grateful to those present who made helpful comments and suggestions.
Thanks, too, go to two anonymous referees of this journal.
85Beall (2014b), which is a reply to Weber et al (2014), which is in turn a reply to Beall
(2014a). References in what follows are to Beall (2014b), unless specified otherwise.
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15.1 The Inclosure Scheme
The Inclosure Schema concerns monadic predicates, ϕ, and θ, and a monadic
function, δ, which appear to satisfy the following conditions, where Ω = {y :
ϕ(y)}:86
• Existence: Ω exists, and θ(Ω)
• Transcendence: if x ⊆ Ω and θ(x), δ(x) /∈ x
• Closure: if x ⊆ Ω and θ(x), δ(x) ∈ Ω
Applying δ to Ω, the Closure and Transcendence conditions give: δ(Ω) ∈
Ω ∧ δ(Ω) /∈ Ω.
The standard set theoretic and semantic paradoxes fit the scheme. Thus,
in the Burali Forti paradox, ϕ(y) is: y is an ordinal; θ(x) is the vacuous
condition, x = x; and δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than all those in x.
Transcendence and Closure are secured by definition.
In the Liar paradox, ϕ(y) is Ty (y is true); θ(x) is the condition that
x has a name, and δ(x) is a sentence, s, of the form 〈s /∈ x˙〉, where angle
brackets are a name-forming device, and x˙ is a name for x. Suppose x ⊆ Ω.
Then s ∈ x˙, so s is true, and so s /∈ x˙. By Excluded Middle, we have
Transcendence. But this establishes that s is true, so we have Closure.
The Schema shows that all these paradoxes are of the same kind. So by
the Principle of Uniform Solution (Same Kind of Paradox, Same Kind of
Solution), they should all have the same kind of solution.87
15.2 What is a Paradox?
Another part of the background discussion requires us to look at what Beall
says on the nature of paradox. He asks (3.5) whether a paradox is an individ-
ual sentence (such as a sentence like T 〈C〉 ⇒ ⊥) or a sentential schema (such
as the schematic T 〈C〉 ⇒ A). The answer is: neither. It is an argument.88
86Beall, in fact, gets the status of these conditions wrong (3.1). The conditions do not
need actually to be satisfied, as he says, but only prima facie so. (Priest (2002), 17.2.)
Recall that the origin of the schema is in Russell, who certainly did not take the conditions
to be satisfied.
87All this is argued in Priest (2002), esp. Part 3, and 17.2.
88So I do not think that the sentence referred to by g is an inclosure paradox, contra
his fn. 19.
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It would be wrong to identify a paradox with the sentence at the end of the
argument: it would be silly, for example, to take Zeno’s Arrow Paradox to
be that the arrow does not move—or even that it does and does not move.
What is important about the paradox is the argument for its conclusion.
One might yet ask whether a paradox is an individual argument or an
argument schema. If I had to answer this question I would say that it is a
schema. But the answer would be very misleading. Let me explain.
Paradoxes are arguments. So to individuate a paradox, one has to indi-
viduate arguments. What are the criteria of individuation? I have no good
answer to this question, and neither, as far as I know, does anyone else.
To see the difficulty, let us focus on the notion of a mathematical proof—a
particularly well-defined kind of argument. Many mathematical results have
a number of different proofs. Thus, take Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem,
say in the form that Peano Arithmetic (PA) is not complete. One proof of
this goes via the construction of a sentence which “says of itself that it is
not provable in PA”. This is, of course, the proof that was given in Go¨del’s
original paper. It can also be found in text books such as Boolos and Jeffrey’s
Computability and Logic and Meldelsohn’s Mathematical Logic.
Compare this with the following (sketch of) a proof. First we prove the
Halting Theorem, as did Turing: whether a certain program halts is not
decidable. We then observe that the statement of halting can be expressed
by a sentence of first-order arithmetic. Now, if PA were complete, there
would be a decision procedure. We simply enumerate the theorems until we
get to either a proof or a refutation. So PA is not complete. This is clearly
a different proof—or form of proof: one can naturally say either. That is
obvious, even without a precise criterion of individuation. But what should
that criterion be?
Another thing is also obvious. There are some details of a proof that are
“parametric”. They can be filled in in a number of different ways. And how
one does so is irrelevant to what is going on. Thus, in the case of the first
proof of Go¨del’s theorem, the precise details of the axiomatization of PA, or
of how the go¨del coding is done, are irrelevant to the proof.
So it is with arguments in general. Let me illustrate the point again with
another example. Consider the form of argument which we might call ‘appeal
to the Bible’. John says ‘The Bible says that one should take an eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth, so one should take an eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth’. Mary says ‘The Bible says that you should turn the other cheek,
so you should turn the other cheek’. They are both using the same form of
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argument: ‘The Bible says that A; ergo A’. The A here is a parameter.
15.3 The Liar and Curry
The third piece of background concerns the Liar and Curry themselves. The
Liar involves a sentence, L, of the form ¬T 〈L〉. Beall takes the truth predi-
cate to be transparent, and so to satisfy the positive T -rules:
A
T 〈A〉
We may follow him in this regard.89 We now have:
T 〈L〉
L
¬T 〈L〉
Excluded Middle then gives us ¬T 〈L〉, which is L, and so the T -Schema
gives us T 〈L〉 as well.
Various features of such an argument are parametric. It matters not one
iota whether the self-reference is obtained by a demonstrative, ‘this sentence
is not true’; by a definite description, ‘the sentence written on the blackboard
is not true’ (where this is the only sentence written on the blackboard); or by
some form of go¨del coding, ‘the sentence with go¨del code n is not true’—where
this sentence has code n. These details are parametric, and irrelevant.
Now, consider the Curry paradox. This forms a sentence, C, of the form:
T 〈C〉 → A, where A is arbitrary.90 (Let us call A the arbitrary sentence.)
On the basis of this, A is then established. We first establish a conditional.
T 〈C〉
C
T 〈C〉 T 〈C〉 → A
A
T 〈C〉 → A
89As we noted in 4.1, if one formulates the T -schema merely as a material biconditional
instead, the solutions to the Liar and Curry are the same—the failure of a material de-
tachment, due to a dialetheic sentence. One may, then, accept that the two paradoxes are
of a piece. The issue becomes vexed only when this is not the case.
90I use → for this conditional, since it is necessary to apply modus ponens to it.
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The last step discharges the two occurrences of the assumption T 〈C〉, and
so deploys Contraction. But the conditional delivers its own antecedent.
T 〈C〉 → A
C
T 〈C〉
Modus ponens does the rest.
This is a quite different form of argument from the Liar. The conclusion
need not even be a contradiction. Moreover, and importantly, A is completely
irrelevant to the Curry argument. It is a simple parameter (not present in
the Liar paradox at all). Something—the same thing—has gone wrong with
the form of argument, whether or not A is true or false. One should not
be able to establish that God exists or that God does not exist or that God
both exists and does not, by such irrelevant considerations.
And since the paradoxical conclusion does not have to be a contradic-
tion, it is entirely obvious that the Curry paradox does not fit the Inclosure
Schema.
One can try to force it into the Schema. We take the components of the
scheme to be as follows. ϕ(y) is Ty; θ(x) is the condition that x has a name,
and δ(x) is a sentence, c, of the form 〈c ∈ x˙→ A〉. Suppose x ⊆ Ω. The
argument for Closure tracks the above reasoning. Suppose that c ∈ x˙. Then
c is true. So, c ∈ x˙ → A, and since c ∈ x˙, A follows. By →-introduction,
c ∈ x˙ → A, that is, c is true. But here we grind to a halt. There is no
argument for Transcendence.
15.4 Neo-Curry Paradoxes
We are now in a position to address Beall’s arguments. The major one is this.
One may agree that the Curry with arbitrary A does not fit the schema. But
consider the paradox where the A in question is false (or maybe logically
false). We might call such paradoxes falsidical Curries; Beall calls them
Neo-Curry paradoxes. The argument for Transcendence now goes through.
Closure has delivered the truth of c ∈ x˙ → A. Given that ¬A, we can
contrapose to infer that c /∈ x˙. That is, Transcendence. So, it seems, we
have an inclosure paradox.
Does this show that Curry’s paradox is an inclosure paradox? No. The
fact that the argument has special cases that fit the schema does not show
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that the general form does. The fact that some cubic equations, ax3 + bx2 +
cx+d = 0, are quadratic (when a = 0) obviously does not tell you that cubic
equations are quadratic.
However, Beall suggest that we should simply take falsidical Curries to
be sui generis. Not a good move. Such paradoxes are exactly the same
as the ones with true A. The heart of the Curry paradox is establishing a
conclusion which is entirely arbitrary. Whether or not it is true, is completely
irrelevant. If one does not understand this, one has not really understood
Curry paradoxes.
The point of the Inclosure Schema is an explanatory one: to explain how
it is that paradox arises. It needs to locate the essence of the phenomenon, so
to say. The instances of the Curry argument constitute, as it were, a natural
kind. The falsidical ones do not. So much the worse for thinking that you
can individuate arguments in such a simplistic fashion. The following is a
valid argument (form): A ∧ B ` A. Suppose we restrict ourselves to those
cases where B is false. Do we have a different kind of argument? Obviously
not.
Another way of seeing the point is this. The Neo-Curry paradoxes ef-
fectively add a premise of the form ¬A to the Curry paradox. But the
Curry argument to an arbitrary conclusion, even with false A, needs no such
premise. Thus, if the Neo-Curry paradox, can be massaged to fit the inclo-
sure schema, it is because one has added an irrelevant premise. Then saying
that it is an inclosure paradox is like saying that ∧-elimination depends on
the the Law of Excluded Middle, because {A ∨ ¬A, A ∧B} ` A.
But what of the case when A is just⊥? Can one not define ¬B as B → ⊥?
And can we not reformulate the Curry reasoning so that its conclusions are
T 〈C〉 and T 〈C〉 → ⊥. In that case, how can there be a difference between
the Liar paradox and this instance of the Curry paradox? It is not at all clear
that ¬B and B → ⊥ mean the same: one concerns conditionality; the other
does not. But even if they do mean the same, the thought simply confuses
a paradox with its conclusion. The fact that a sentence occurs at the end of
two different arguments, a Liar and a Curry, does not make the arguments
the same. (As I noted, there can be quite different arguments for Go¨del’s
Theorem.)
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15.5 The Material Conditional
In the course of his discussion, Beall raises the question of what to say about
the Curry paradox formulated with a material conditional. Let us look at
this.
Consider a sentence M , of the form T 〈M〉 ⊃ A, where the conditional is
material. That is, M is ¬T 〈M〉 ∨ A. We may now reason as follows.
T 〈M〉
M
¬T 〈M〉 ∨ A
Of course, assuming ¬T 〈M〉 gives us ¬T 〈M〉 ∨ A as well. So by Excluded
Middle, we have ¬T 〈M〉 ∨ A. But this is just M . The T -Schema and the
Disjunctive Syllogism then deliver A.
To fit the argument into the Inclosure Schema, we would have to proceed
as follows. ϕ(y) is Ty; θ(x) is the condition that x has a name, and δ(x) is
a sentence, m, of the form 〈m /∈ x˙ ∨ A〉. Let x ⊆ Ω. Suppose that m ∈ x˙.
Then m is true. So, m /∈ x˙∨A. But if m /∈ x˙, then m /∈ x˙∨A as well. So by
Excluded Middle, we have established that m is true. There is no argument
for Transcendence, however. As with the usual Curry, if we add an extra
(and irrelevant) premise, that ¬A, we can, though, obtain an argument for
Transcendence with the Disjunctive Syllogism.
The situations, then, concerning the material and immaterial Curries are
exactly the same. And all my comments carry over to the material Curry
wholesale. In particular, it is not an inclosure paradox; and considering
falsidical versions of it changes nothing.
Beall finds this incredible. Of the special case of the material Curry where
A is ⊥, he says (p. 843):
Consider, for example,
g = 〈¬Tg ∨ ⊥〉
which is no longer an inclosure paradox!
An exclamation mark substitutes for an argument. We are back, however,
with Beall’s false dichotomy. A paradox is not a sentence: it is an argument.
And the same sentence can occur at the end of a (material) Curry-like argu-
ment and at the end of a Liar-like argument. Indeed, in this case we need
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have no qualms about the relationship between negation and the conditional.
¬Tg ∨ ⊥ is just a simple logical variant of ¬Tg.91
Of course, there is a close connection between the material Curry and
the Liar qua arguments, and a little thought shows exactly what this is. We
can obtain an argument for an arbitrary conclusion from the Liar, just by
extending the argument with an instance of Explosion:92
T 〈L〉 ∧ ¬T 〈L〉
A
The material Curry uses the Disjunctive Syllogism; and as is frequently
noted, Explosion and the Disjunctive Syllogism come to essentially the same
thing. For A,¬A ∨ B give us (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ B, and Explosion delivers B.
Conversely, A ∧ ¬A delivers A and ¬A ∨ B, and the Disjunctive Syllogism
gives us B. So it is the Liar plus Explosion which is essentially the same as
the material Curry. The Liar paradox is a part of this. When one senses a
connection (perhaps Beall’s exclamation mark?), that is what one is sensing.
So the material Curry and the Liar are different. But does not a dialethe-
ist want to solve the material Curry by appealing to the fact that we may
have a dialetheia present, and so faulting the Disjunctive Syllogism (and Ex-
plosion)? Indeed they do. But no one ever said that dialetheism can solve
only one form of paradox, as I have already discussed in 4.1. Moreover, and
crucially, the dialetheic solution to the Liar provides the basis of the solu-
tion to the material Curry. It is the fact that the Liar paradox establishes a
dialetheia which renders a subsequent or entangled use of Explosion or the
Disjunctive Syllogism inappropriate.
Finally, are the standard Curry and the material Curry of the same kind?
That will depend on one’s view of the conditional. If one takes it that the
conditional is the material conditional, they are, of course, exactly the same.
If one, more wisely, does not, then they use quite different forms of argument.
Consider an argument for some conclusion which uses classical reductio, and
91Similar considerations apply to the other paradox which Beall notes in this context,
which concerns a sentence, r, of the form 〈¬Tr ∧ >〉.
92A referee commented that it is this which should be thought of as the Liar para-
dox—otherwise it is not clear why it really is a paradox. I find this a very strange sug-
gestion. The Liar paradox was recognised as a paradox in Ancient Greek and Medieval
logic without any reference to Explosion. Indeed, the Ancient Greeks knew nothing of
that inference.
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so is intuitionistically invalid. Consider, also, an intuitionistically valid ar-
gument for the same conclusion. Most would agree that these are different
arguments, since they use different forms of inference. Similarly for the imma-
terial and material Curries. One uses contraction and modus ponens where
the other uses ∨-introduction and the disjunctive syllogism—different forms
of inferences.
15.6 Sorites
We have now dealt with Beall’s main argument. But he has another, ad
hominem, argument. I (and others) have argued that the Sorites paradox
fits the Inclosure Schema.93 Beall does not himself subscribe to this view,
but he claims that if the Sorites is an inclosure paradox, so is the Curry
paradox.
He argues as follows. Just as we may use the Curry to establish both
true and false As, we can use a sorites argument to establish true and false
As. And ‘this undercuts the inclosure argument for the sorites at exactly
the same point [as one] arrests the corresponding argument for the Curry
paradox: namely contraposition’ (p. 847).
Let us look at the matter carefully. How, exactly, does the sorites argu-
ment fit the Inclosure Schema?94
Let P be a tolerant predicate. (This is a parameter.) ϕ(y) is Py, so
Ω = {y : Py}, and a0, ..., an is a soritical sequence that takes us from inside Ω
to outside. If x ⊆ Ω then there must be a first member of the sequence not in
it. Let this be δ(x). By definition, δ(x) /∈ x. So we have Transcendence. But
since all the members of x are P , and δ(x) is next to one of them, Pδ(x), by
tolerance.95 The inclosure contradiction is of the form δ(Ω) /∈ Ω ∧ δ(Ω) ∈ Ω:
the first thing in the sequence that is not P is P .
Note that an arbitrary A is playing no role in this argument at all. In
particular, nowhere has contraposition been used. Transcendence holds by
definition. Closure holds by tolerance. We have not had to make a stipula-
tion about an arbitrary A to ensure either. That we can use the sorites to
establish some things that are true and some things that are false is com-
pletely irrelevant.
93See Priest (2010) and Weber, Ripley, Priest, Hyde and Colyvan (2014).
94See Priest (2010).
95This assumes that x is non-empty. If it is empty Pδ(x) ex hypothesi.
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15.7 The Bottom Line
What the preceding considerations appear to establish is that the Liar and
Curry are not of the same kind, though the Liar and the Sorites are. A liar-
like sentence can, however, occur at the end of both a Liar-style argument
and a Curry style argument. Moreover, a material Curry is also not of the
same kind as the Liar—though it is essentially related to it in a way that the
Curry is not.
There may well be more to be said about all of these issues. Indeed, one
thing we have learned from recent discussions is how subtle and unobvious
these matters are. Beall somewhat incautiously entitled his paper ‘The End
of Inclosure’. The Schema might well reply, as Mark Twain is often reported
as having said: ‘News of my death has been greatly exaggerated’.
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